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Administrative and Judicial Review of Medicare
Issues: A Guide Through The Maze
Michael Neel-Kvarme *
Medicare' provides basic and supplementary health insurance
to those over age 65.2 In recent years, the health care industry and
Medicare beneficiaries have grown increasingly dissatisfied with the
procedures used to determine eligibility, reimbursement and cover-
age under the program.3 The dissatisfaction of Medicare partici-
pants has highlighted the inadequacies of existing administrative and
judicial review mechanisms.
This article examines administrative and judicial review within
the Medicare program; more specifically: (1) the extent to which the
government is required to provide administrative and judicial re-
view; and (2) the degree to which particular procedures further the
goals underlying the Medicare Act. The first section of the article
outlines the framework of the Medicare system; the second section
considers the adequacy of the administrative procedures for handling
Medicare disputes. Finally, in the third section, the article examines
the various means of obtaining judicial review.
I. The Medicare Program
Medicare is designed to provide basic and supplementary health
• Associate, Weintraub, Genshlea, Giannoni & Sproul, Sacramento, Calif. A.B., Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, 1976. J.D., University of California, Davis, 1979. The author
previously served as Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert L. Kunzig, Judge, United States
Court of Claims. The author was formerly associated with Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
Washington, D.C. and wishes to thank the firm for its support. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395rr (1976 & Supp. 1978). See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1395ss (Supp.
1980) for amendments after 1978.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(c) [Part A], 1395j [Part B] (1976 & Supp. 1978).
3 It appears that in the future an increasing portion of the population will be eligible for
Medicare benefits. Between 1970 and 1979, for instance, there was a drop in the percentage
of the population under age 13 (decreases of 8.8% under age 5, and 16.4% between ages 5 and
13), while there was a significant increase in the number of people age 65 and over (increase
of 23.5%). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS P-25, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, PUB. No. 874, 12 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as POPULATION ESTIMATES]. In 1979, approximately 24.1 million aged persons
and 2.9 million disabled beneficiaries were covered by Part A. H.R. Doc. No. 333, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). Similarly, 23.8 million aged and 2.7 million disabled persons elected
Part B coverage in 1979.
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insurance for those over age 65.4 The program is divided into two
parts: A and B. Part A is the basic national health plan covering
hospitalization and post-hospital care. Part B is a supplementary in-
surance program covering physician and related health care services.
While the two parts are largely independent, they at times overlap,
causing accounting and conceptual difficulties. 5 Consideration of
both parts is necessary to understand their interrelationship and to
compare their respective review mechanisms.
A. Medicare Part A-The Basic Protection
Medicare, Part A, "provides basic protection against the costs of
hospital and related post-hospital services."' 6 Part A beneficiaries in-
clude persons over 65 and disabled persons entitled to Social Security
benefits. 7 Coverage is automatic for qualified individuals. The pro-
gram is funded by employee wage and self-employment taxes.8
Part A reimburses qualified providers for the cost of health care
services rendered to beneficiaries.9 Qualified providers may include
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies.' 0 To
qualify under Part A, the facility must meet the requirements of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)"I and enter into the
necessary agreements. 12 A qualified provider' 3 is entitled to reim-
4 See note 2 supra. For a discussion of the operation of the Medicare program, see gener-
ally Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S.
Ct. 2312 (1981); Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526, 527-30 (Ct. CI. 1980) (en
banc); Butler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Butler].
5 See, e.g., Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526, 528-30 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See
also Hospital San Jorge, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 616 F.2d 580, 585-89 (1st Cir. 1980) (deal-
ing with the Secretary's difficulty in determining under which program hospital-based physi-
cians are properly reimbursed).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1976).
7 The statute provides health care for:
(1) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits
under subchapter II of this chapter or under the railroad retirement system, (2) in-
dividuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to bene-
fits under subchapter II of this chapter or under the railroad retirement system on
the basis of a disability, and (3) certain individuals who do not meet the conditions
specified in either clause (1) or (2) but who are medically determined to have end
stage renal disease.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (Supp. 1980).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1976), funded by taxes imposed by I.R.C. §§ 1401(b) (self-employ-
ment tax), 3101(b), 3111(b) (tax on wages).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395f (1976).
10 Id § 1395x(u).
11 Formerly Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
12 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1011-.1230 (1980) (criteria for qualification).
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bursement based upon the lesser of "reasonable costs" or "customary
charges."
14
Although Part A reimbursement is eventually paid by HHS
from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund,' 5 the provider has
a choice between seeking reimbursement directly from HHS or from
a fiscal intermediary. Most providers seek reimbursement from a
fiscal intermediary,16 usually a private insurance plan such as Blue
Cross. The intermediary is under contract with the Secretary to de-
termine eligibility and the reasonableness of costs, audit the provider,
make payments, and provide assistance.17 The intermediary acts as
an "agent" 8 or "field service"' 9 for the Secretary.
In order to provide the necessary cash-flow and to insure the
continuing treatment of beneficiaries, intermediaries are authorized
to make interim payments to providers throughout the fiscal year.
The interim payments are based upon an estimate of the provider's
costs. 20 At the end of the fiscal year, the provider must file an ac-
counting which the intermediary reviews.2 1 The intermediary deter-
mines the allowability and reasonableness of the costs. 22 The
intermediary's costs are then apportioned between Medicare and
non-Medicare patients in order to insure that Medicare pays only the
13 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1976). See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477, 479
(Ct. Cl. 1980).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(b), 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976). Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States,
616 F.2d 477, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1980). The majority of Medicare litigation has involved a determi-
nation of the amount of reimbursement to which a provider is entitled.
15 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1976). See Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526, 528
(Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc).
16 Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526, 527 (Ct. Cl. 1980). The Medicare
program is structured to encourage the use of fiscal intermediaries as private administrators.
In St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., 537 F.2d 283, 287 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976), the then
responsible HEW conceded that using a fiscal intermediary conferred significant benefits on
the provider.
17 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1976). Seegeneral Homer & Platten, Medicare Provider Reimburse-
ment Disputes: An Analpsis of the Administrative Hearing Procedures, 63 CEo. L.J. 107 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Homer & Platten].
18 Cf. Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 500, 501 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(fiscal intermediary constitutes an agent of the Secretary).
19 Himmler v. Califano, 611 F.2d 137, 140 (6th Cir. 1979); Martinez v. Richardson, 472
F.2d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 1973).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803 (1980). See Moody Nursing Home,
Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 399, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
21 42 C.F.R. § 405.406(b) (1980).
22 To be allowable, a cost must be incurred for a service covered by the insurance pro-
gram. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.101-.196 (allowable), 405.301-.316
(nonreimbursable) (1980). The reasonable or customary charge question only arises for al-
lowable costs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f, 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.401-.554
(1980).
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expenses relating to individuals covered by the program. 23 Finally,
the intermediary adjusts future interim payments to compensate for
any deficit or surplus accruing when past interim payments are com-
pared with actual reimbursable costs. 24 The review provided for the
various decisions in this process will be discussed in part II.
B. Medicare Part B--iuplementag Coverage
Medicare Part B25 is a government-subsidized health insurance
plan providing supplementary coverage to Part A. Those eligible for
Part A can elect to enroll in Part B and receive coverage upon the
payment of monthly premiums. 26 Benefits are paid from the Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund which is adminis-
tered by HHS and funded by patient premiums and matching fed-
eral grants.
27
Generally, Part B pays 80% of the cost of physician services, re-
lated health services and prosthetic devices.2 8 The beneficiary is re-
imbursed on the basis of the physician's reasonable charge rather
than actual cost.29 While the insurance covers the patient directly,
Medicare allows the physician or the provider to take an assignment
of the patient's rights and seek recovery.
30
Part B resembles Part A in that HHS does not actually adminis-
ter the program. Rather, HHS is empowered to contract with carri-
ers who, like fiscal intermediaries, act as a field service. 3' Carriers are
responsible for auditing providers, reviewing charges and paying
23 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
24 42 C.F.R. § 405.405 (1980); Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526, 527 (Ct.
Cl. 1980).
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w (1976 & Supp. 1978).
26 Id §§ 1395j, 13 9 5p, 1395r. Seegenerally Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580 (Ct.
Cl. 1980) (en banc), cer. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981); Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581
F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1978); Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v. Matthews, 434 F. Supp. 1036
(E.D. Va. 1977).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j, 1395t (1976). Seegeneral'y Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634
F.2d 526 (Ct. C1. 1980) (emphasizing separate nature of Part A and Part B trust funds).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k(a)(1), 13951, 1395x(s) (1976).
29 Id § 1395L See Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526 (Ct. C1. 1980) (high-
lighting the importance of the difference in Part A-B context).
30 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1976). See Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d
1010, 1012 (lst Cir. 1978).
31 See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980), prob. juris, noted sub nom.
Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), staygranted, [1981-1 Transfer
Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981);
Drs. Russi, Griffen & Snell, Ltd. v. Mathews, 438 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (E.D. Va. 1977). See
a/ro notes 18-19 supra.
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benefits.3 2 The Secretary has designed review procedures for Part B
but they are of a more limited scope than those under Part A. The
procedures and their ramifications will be discussed in part II.
II. Administrative Review
Due to congressional and administrative concern over the poten-
tial costs of Medicare litigation, administrative and judicial review
has been limited within the Medicare system.3 3 The limitations im-
posed vary within a maze of some five review schemes. The extent of
review available to beneficiaries or providers ranges from the consid-
erable protection afforded by the Provider Reimbursement Review
Board (PRRB)3 4 to the unreviewable actions taken by Utilization
Review Committees.
The need for review within the Medicare system is demon-
strated by the high reversal rate in Part A and Part B procedures
which allow a reexamination of the initial administrative decision.
Such decisions are reversed in 39 to 51 percent of all Part A hear-
ings.3 5 Similarly, Part B hearings reverse one-third of the cases
brought.3 6 One can only speculate as to the accuracy of the decisions
32 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1976).
33 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff(b), 1395oo (1976). See a/so S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 213 (1972) (explaining the $100 amount in controversy minimum required to establish
entitlement to a hearing).
34 The PRRB was added in 1972 effective for fiscal years ending June 30, 1973 or later.
Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 243(a) & (c), 86 Stat. 1420-22 (1972), now codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1976).
35 BUREAU OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
PART A INTERMEDIARY APPEALS REPORT JULY-SEPT. 1980, at 3 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
PART A REPORT).
36 BUREAU OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
PART B APPEALS ACTIvITY JAN.-MAR. 1980, at 4 (table 2) (1980). See aro Gray Panthers v.
Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 9196 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 18, 1981); McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409,416 (N.D. Cal. 1980)prob.juris. noted
sub non. Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stagranted, [1981-1
Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12,
1981). In McClure, the court noted:
Defendants establish[ed] that between 1975 and 1978, carriers wholly or partially
reversed, upon "review determination," their initial determinations in 51-57% of
the cases considered. Of the adverse determination decisions brought before hear-
ing officers, 42-51% of the carriers' decisions were reversed in whole or in part.
503 F. Supp. at 416 [1980 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 30,522, at 9991.
Similarly, in Gray Panthers, the D.C. Circuit pointed out plaintiffs' contention that "approxi-
mately 50% of the formal hearings that are held on claims over $100 result in adjustments of
benefits in the claimant's favor. . . " [1981 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH)
1 30,746, at 9196. The Secretary had contended that the reversal rate was only one-tenth of
one percent based on comparing the number of reversals to the total denials for that year.
Such comparisons can engender confusion, as the court stated, "[b]are statistics rarely provide
[Vol. 57:1]
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for which review is unavailable or inadequate.
Before analyzing individual review procedures it is useful to con-
sider the statutory and constitutional constraints under which the
Medicare system operates. The internal workings of the Medicare
program are governed in part by the strictures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).37 Informal rulemaking procedures must be
followed by HHS in promulgating substantive and procedural
rules. 38 Additionally, the APA provides guidance in determining the
required procedures for administrative hearings. 39 A unique prob-
lem arises when the Secretary delegates rulemaking functions to in-
termediaries and carriers. 4° It has been held that standards and
procedures promulgated on behalf of the Secretary by intermediaries
and carriers constitute a form of informal rulemaking to which APA
standards apply.
4'
Another constraint under which the Medicare system operates is
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 42 Essentially, proce-
dural due process requires the government to provide a meaningful
hearing to those whose life, liberty or property interests are affected
by its actions.43 Substantive due process prevents certain disparate
treatment by the federal government.
44
a satisfactory measure of the fairness ofa decisionmaking process." [1981-1 Transfer Binder]
MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 9210 n.23, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 346 (1976). The purpose of noting these statistics is to show the magnitude of the prob-
lem that exists.
37 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). The APA is not, however, an independent source of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
38 Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1080-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The court made this conclusion despite the arguable bar present in § 205(h). See section II
infita. Although the court found Humana's complaint lacking, as a policy matter establishing
review for APA violations makes the Secretary more responsive.
39 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1976).
40 For example, the Provider Reimbursement manual (manual) is published by Blue
Cross and HHS. At times, the government has attempted to enforce the manual's provisions
as substantive regulations although they are not promulgated in accord with the APA. To
date, the courts have rejected any substantive use of the manual. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v.
United States, 558 F.2d 8, 12-14 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
41 Se, e.g., Overlook Nursing Homes, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 500 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
42 U.S. Const. amend. V. See general4, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
43 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1975).
44 Substantive due process arises from the equal protection principles which apply to the
federal government through the fifth amendment's due process clause. See Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 529, 532-38 (1973); Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
413 U.S. 508, 511-14 (1973); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 n.11 (1971) (invalidating
racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools as violative of due process rights
guaranteed by fifth amendment). "[Tihe concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness are not mutually exclusive. . ..
[October 1981]
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Activation of the due process clause requires a determination
that the affected person has a protected interest4 5 and that state ac-
tion rather than private action is involved.46 To have a protected
interest in a governmental benefit the party must have "more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilat-
eral expectation of it. He must instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.))
4 7
In the Medicare context, the Supreme Court recently noted that
Medicare beneficiaries have a protected interest in direct benefits. 48
Additionally, providers and Part B beneficiaries have contractual
rights with the Secretary. 49 One commentator contends that a bene-
ficiary's interest in the Medicare trust funds alone creates a protect-
able interest.
50
The existence of state action in the Medicare context is clear.
Where HHS makes the final decision regarding a beneficiary's eligi-
bility, the government's involvement is not in doubt.51 Where the
final decision is made by a private insurer acting as a fiscal interme-
diary or carrier, the government's involvement, although not as ap-
parent, is nonetheless present. Carriers, intermediaries and
Utilization Review Committees all act on behalf of the Secretary in
administering Medicare52 and are thus the government's agents for
purposes of the due process clause.
53
[D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id at 499. See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment").
45 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1971).
46 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Cospito v. Califano, [1981-
1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,977, at 10,046-47 (D.NJ. Feb. 5, 1981).
47 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
48 O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980). By contrast, the
Court determined that patients did not have an interest in indirect benefits such as the certifi-
cation of a provider.
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395p-13 9 5 s (1976). Set Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1
Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 23 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981)
(HHS "does not dispute that the claimants' interest in receiving the medical insurance bene-
fits for which they have paid a monthly premium is a property interest .... '). See also
Jones, Temination of Skilled Nursing Facility Medicaid Provider Agreements: Procedural Due Process
Requirements, 6 AM. J.L. MED. 451, 475 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Jones]. But cf. Chelsea
Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross, 436 F. Supp. 1050, 1059 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (plain-
tiffs cannot complain of improper delegation to intermediaries since they chose that route).
50 See Butler, supra note 4, at 149.
51 See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
52 See notes 18, 19 & 31 supra.
53 In fact, most courts have assumed this conclusion or have not raised the issue. Sacred
Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Blue Cross Association an agent of
the government while acting as intermediary); Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v. Mathews,
[Vol. 57:1]
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Given the presence of both state action and a protected interest,
procedural due process requires a balancing of the governmental and
private interests at stake.54 The Supreme Court has stressed that
there are no uniform procedural due process requirements. 55 In Ma-
thews v. Eldridge,56 the Court outlined the balancing approach which
should be taken in applying the requirements of the due process
clause to a particular situation.57 The courts must consider the pri-
vate interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the value of
additional safeguards, and the government's interest, including the
burden which would be caused by the additional safeguards. 58 At a
minimum, procedural due process seems to require notice and some
form of hearing.59 The ultimate test is whether a meaningful hearing
is provided at a meaningful time.60 Additionally, the courts have
found due process to include a right to an impartial decisionmaker,
61
the right to present evidence, and the right to obtain a decision on
the record.62 The scope and nature of the requisite procedures must
438 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (E.D. Va. 1977) (insurer constituted governmental agent for purposes
of the fifth amendment). See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. &
MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981) (dealing with constitutionality of
carrier decisions); McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (examining imparti-
ality of carrier hearing officers), prob. juris, noted sub noma. Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH)
1 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981).
54 Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.20, 100, 103 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
55 435 U.S. at 86.
56 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
57 424 U.S. at 334-35; 397 U.S. at 263. See genrally Note, Mathews v. Eldridge: A Fair
Test on Balance, 67 GEO. L.J. 1407 (1979).
58 424 U.S. at 334-35.
59 Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981). Professor Tribe notes the recent Supreme Court trend to
adopt a positivist theory whereby "the substantive right may [not] be viewed wholly apart
from the procedure provided for its enforcement." TRIBE, supra note 42, at 534. If such a
theory were adopted, Congress could conceivably eliminate all due process rights through
limitations imposed in the creation of a governmental benefit. The better, and seemingly
majority, rule is that once Congress establishes a governmental benefit, the Constitution pro-
tects an individual's rights regardless of any attempted limitations. A limitation is properly
viewed as an expression of the government's interest to be taken into the balance. Id at § 10-
12.
60 424 U.S. at 333.
61 McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (Part B carrier decisions consti-
tutionally invalid due to partiality of decisionmaker), prob. juri, noted sub nom Schweiker v.
McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED.
& MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981).
62 B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 67, at 192-93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ].
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be determined for each particular situation. Moreover, the existence
of judicial review can cure administrative failings.63 The section
which follows examines procedural questions as well as substantive
restrictions in light of these general guidelines.
A. Beneftiag, Coverage-Provider Utilization Review Committees
Medicare requires the institution of Provider Utilization Review
Committees (UR Committees).64 To qualify as a Medicare provider,
an in-house UR Committee, composed of at least two physicians,
must be established. 65 UR Committees determine the eligibility of
Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, the Committee reviews the ne-
cessity, appropriateness, and quality of each patient's care.
66
UR Committee decisions have a direct effect on the patient's
right to receive Medicare benefits. Although patients and their doc-
tors are entitled to prompt notice of UR Committee decisions, 67 the
patient, as well as the intermediary and HHS, are bound by a Com-
mittee determination that the patient's care is not necessary. 68 In
contrast, the intermediary and Secretary are not bound by a Com-
mittee determination that the patient is entitled to a particular
health care service.69
When the UR Committee makes an adverse determination, the
statute suspends the right to receive payment for any services pro-
vided more than three days after notice of the decision is received.70
The patient has no right to appear or to present evidence before the
UR Committee.7' While the physician can ask for reconsideration of
63 Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,746 at 9206 n.9 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 434 U.S. 319, 349
(1976) (contracted administrative procedures justified by the presence of extensive judicial
review).
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(j)(8), 1395x(k) (1976). See generaly Price, Katz & Provence, An
Advocate's Guide to Utilization Review, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 307 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Utilzation Review]I.
65 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k)(2) (1976).
66 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1980). See also Moody Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 621
F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1980). UR Committees are designed to control the quality and cost of
health care. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1979); Utilization Review, supra note 64, at 308.
67 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k)(4) (1976).
68 Butler, sura note 4, at 843 n. 156.
69 See Utilization Review, supra note 64, at 310; Butler, sura note 4, at 843.
70 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7) (1976).
71 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035(o (1980). The Committee chooses relevant materials to ex-
amine. Id § 405.1035(0(1)(vi). The regulations only provide for the patient's physician to
present his views. Id § 405.1035 (0 (5). This is consistent with the view that operation of the
plans are a function of the medical profession. Id § 405.1035(c).
[Vol. 57:1]
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the UR Committee decision, the patient has no right to seek review.7 2
Moreover, no immediate agency or judicial review is available to
challenge any decision or procedure. 73 The UR Committee proce-
dure appears to violate the due process and equal protection guaran-
tees of the fifth amendment 74 and possibly the patient's right to
privacy.
The requirements of the due process clause apply to UR Com-
mittee decisions if the existence of state action and a protected inter-
est are established. 75 Like intermediaries and carriers, the UR
Committees are essentially agents of the government. 76 The Com-
mittees determine whether individuals are entitled to the benefits of
a government program. 77 Thus, it appears that the state action re-
quirement of the due process clause is met in this situation.7 8
In light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in O'Bannon v.
Town Court Nursing Center,79 it is clear that UR Committee decisions
affect a protected interest of the beneficiary. An adverse decision by
the UR Committee denies the patient a direct governmental benefit.
As the Supreme Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelly,80 a protected interest
exists for government welfare benefits where, as here, "[s]uch benefits
are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
72 Id § 405.1035(0(5). In fact, if the attending physician does not testify, the final deci-
sion may be made by one physician rather than two. Id § 405.1035(e)(4). Seegenerally Butler,
supra note 4, at 844.
73 See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1980). See also note 105 infra.
74 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See notes 43-44 supra.
75 See text accompanying notes 44-63 supra. See also Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v.
Mathews, 438 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (E.D. Va. 1977).
76 See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477, 479 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Blue Cross
Association considered an agent of the government while acting as intermediary); 438 F.
Supp. at 1042 (insurer governmental agent for purposes of fifth amendment).
77 As one commentator analyzing this question has noted: "That decision [that contin-
ued institutional stay is not medically necessary] is the specific public function which the
hospital performs, and in itself constitutes the governmental determination that Medicare
will not pay." Butler, supra note 4, at 844.
78 At the same time, the delegation of HHS's authority to UR Committees increases the
possibility that the administration of Medicare will be influenced by private interests. While
some innate fairness is presumed when the government deals with its own citizens, the same
assumption does not apply to private parties. Thus, the delegation of authority by HHS to
UR Committees demands a more exhaustive inquiry into the fairness afforded the patient.
See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that hearing officers ap-
pointed by carriers do not satisfy the requirements of due process), prob. jurs, noted sub nom
Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted, [198 1-1 Transfer
Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981).
79 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
80 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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them."8
Given the activation of the due process clause, it is useful to
compare UR Committee procedures with the guidelines set forth by
the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kell 82 and Mathews v. Eldridge.8 3 In
Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients were enti-
tled to a trial-type evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of
benefits.8 4 In determining what procedural rights the recipients were
entitled to, the Court stated: "The extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be 'condemned to suffer a grievous loss'. . ., and de-
pends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the government's interest in summary adjudication." 85 The
Court noted that the termination of welfare payments could "deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live. ... 86 The
interests of the government in conserving fiscal and administrative
resources were not considered to be overriding in the welfare context.
The Court concluded that welfare recipients were entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing prior to termination of their benefits.
8 7
In Mathews v. Eldridge88 the Supreme Court held that an eviden-
tiary hearing is not required prior to termination of Social Security
disability benefits. Eldridge synthesized the approach to be taken in
analyzing procedural due process requirements and set forth a bal-
ancing test requiring the consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. 89
81 Id at 262.
82 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
83 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
84 397 U.S. at 264.
85 Id at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
86 397 U.S. at 264.
87 Id at 264-66. The Court stated in weighing the interests of governmental convenience
and the recipient's need: "Thus, the crucial factor in this context ... is that termination of
aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means to live while he waits." Id In Medicare, the same life or death consequences may
attach to the provision of health care services.
88 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89 Id at 335.
[Vol. 57:1]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
While some commentators have argued that Eldridge cut back
on the procedural due process rights announced in Goldberg, the prin-
ciples which guided the Court were essentially the same in both
cases. 90 The major difference between the two cases was in the
weighing of the interests at stake. 9' In Eldidge the court concluded
that the recipients' interests in disability benefits were not as essential
as the recipients' interests in welfare benefits in Goldberg.
The interests at stake in Medicare are more analogous to the
right to welfare benefits in Goldberg than the right to disability bene-
fits in Eldridge. Whether or not a beneficiary receives medical care
could make the difference between life and death-just as the receipt
of subsistence living allowances could.92 Moreover, where death is a
possibility, denial of Medicare could be an irreversible decision.
93
The government's interests in conserving fiscal and administrative re-
sources are outweighed by the private interests at stake.94 Therefore,
Medicare beneficiaries should be entitled to protection similar to that
granted the welfare recipients in Goldberg.
A comparison of the interests examined in Eldidge with the in-
terests involved in UR Committee decisions further supports the con-
clusion that UR Committee procedures are unconstitutional.
Eldridge considered whether a hearing was required prior to the ter-
mination of disability benefits. Although a property interest was
found in the statutory right to benefits,95 the Court considered the
existing procedures sufficient to protect the individual's interests for
several reasons. First, the Court distinguished disability payments
from welfare payments because the former are not necessarily based
upon need. 96 Second, the Court found that the decision to grant dis-
ability benefits can be made by reviewing existing medical treatment
files whereas a determination of poverty requires an oral examina-
tion.97 Finally, in disability decisions, the individual is entitled to
90 See generally Note, Mathews v. Eldridge: A Fair Test on Balance, 67 GEO. L.J. 1407
(1979).
91 See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (emphasizing the "flexible"
nature of due process rights encompassed in the modem weighing process).
92 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 264-66.
93 See Jones, supra note 49, at 469.
94 In Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross, 630 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir.
1980), the Sixth Circuit flatly rejected the conservation of resources argument. The govern-
ment had argued that these interests were sufficient to defeat review of constitutional
questions.
95 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.
96 Id at 340.
97 Id at 343-45. The court noted that an oral presentation in this situation was of much
less value than in Goldberg.
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extensive administrative review and, ultimately, judicial review. 98
Admittedly, there are similarities between disability benefits and
Medicare. Neither is necessarily based upon need and decisions re-
garding the eligibility of beneficiaries can be made on the basis of
medical records.99 In Medicare, however, the medical problem may
arise on an emergency basis requiring immediate attention and pre-
cluding the development of an extensive medical history. The re-
ceipt of medical care is often of more immediate importance than the
receipt of disability payments. Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit re-
cently noted, Eldidge involved only an interruption of disability ben-
efits, whereas in Medicare a permanent loss of benefits is at stake.'00
The most important distinction between the disability benefit
program and Medicare is the extent of administrative review avail-
able to the beneficiary. Prior to terminating disability benefits, a
physician and a non-physician review the individual's file. The two
reviewers examine medical reports as well as the interested party's
submissions, and can order an independent medical examination
when necessary.' 0 ' After a decision is made, the individual is entitled
to receive notice, to make a written response and to submit evidence.
HHS reviews the decision and de novo reconsideration is provided.
Ultimately, judicial review is available. 0 2 By contrast, in .UR Com-
mittee decisions the patient has no right to appear, to present evi-
dence or argument, or to be represented by counsel.'03 The present
UR Committee procedures allow only the patient's doctor to chal-
lenge the decision.t °4 Moreover, while reconsideration is provided,
no immediate agency or judicial review is available. 05 When ex-
amined in light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Goldberg and El-
98 Id at 338-39. The beneficiary is entitled to review any denial, comment, and add
evidence. Id at 346. Additionally, an evidentiary hearing before a Social Security Adminis-
trative Law Judge is provided. Id at 339.
99 The nature and depth of information collected on a short term basis for a UR Com-
mittee determination is arguably far less reliable than the medical files of the patient used in
disability cases.
100 Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1
30,746, at 9202 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
101 424 U.S. at 337.
102 Id at 338-39.
103 See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
104 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1980).
105 Id One commentator has argued that Medicare beneficiaries may be able to obtain
review of adverse UR Committee decisions. See Utilization Review,supra note 62, at 317. Since
activation of Part A hearing procedures requires a' final determination, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ff(b)(1) (1976), which does not include UR Committee decisions, beneficiaries may seek
UR Committee reconsideration through the intermediary and then HHS review of any ad-
verse intermediary decision. See Utilization Review, supra note 62, at 317; 42 C.F.R. § 405.704
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dridge, the UR Committee procedures appear to violate the
constitutional requirements of procedural due process.
The lack of procedural safeguards surrounding UR Committee
decisions necessitates the institution of corrective measures. Initially,
the patient should be notified of the UR Committee's intention to
review his eligibility. 0 6 Some sort of pretermination hearing should
be provided. 0 7 Additionally, the patient should be allowed to pres-
ent evidence to the UR Committee. Since the UR Committee is re-
quired to review the medical file, allowing the submission of evidence
should not be unduly burdensome.108
The review of UR Committee decisions should be expanded. As
it now stands, the Secretary, but not the patient, has the right to
obtain review of adverse UR Committee decisions. It is troubling
that from the patient's perspective any final adverse adjudication is
made by a private organization whereas the Secretary may seek addi-
tional review of decisions adverse to its position. This discrepancy
violates our fundamental conceptions of fairness.'0 9 Several courts
addressing the issue have determined that delegation of decisionmak-
ing authority to a private organization is only appropriate if subse-
quent governmental review is available.' 10 Compounding the
(1980). This pathway cures some of the present defects because it eventually provides in-
dependent administrative review by the Secretary.
Two problems exist, however, with this interpretation. First, it violates the long-standing
agency interpretation of the statute as prohibiting any reconsideration of HHS decisions de-
nying patient coverage. Second, the timing is inappropriate. As the Tenth Circuit noted: "It
may be possible through the administrative route to correct this practice. . . but it would
be a long and tedious process, and by the time these elderly and infirm plaintiffs followed out
this remedy they might no longer be with us." Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1125
(10th Cir. 1973).
106 Set, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) ("The govern-
ment cannot withdraw these direct benefits without giving the patients notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing on the issue of their eligibility for benefits."). As the D.C. Circuit recently
stated in examining the Part B Medicare procedures, "it is universally agreed that adequate
notice lies at the heart of due process." Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder]
MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 9203 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
107 The D.C. Circuit recently held that even in Part B cases involving less than $100, an
informal, pretermination oral hearing is required. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1
Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 9197 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
108 For instance, many medical symptoms are diagnosed by communicating with the pa-
tient. An interview could correct the inadequate records of the patient's physician.
109 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110 St Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 292-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 977 (1976); McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 419 (N.D. Cal. 1980), prob. juris.
noted sub noa. Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted,
[1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice,
June 12, 1981); Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125,
133 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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inadequacy of the present procedure is the probable absence of judi-
cial review which may be constitutionally required."1 '
In both Goldberg and Eldridge, access to further administrative
and judicial review was a factor supporting the constitutionality of
less than full-scale hearing procedures." 2 The government's interest
in preventing a flood of litigation concerning technical medical pro-
cedures must be balanced against the beneficiaries' interest in
presenting their legal claims. It is essential that the courts be able to
review any potential constitutional challenges. I 3  Moreover, ques-
tions may be presented concerning the extent of statutory authority
and the validity of regulations. Judicial review is the only mecha-
nism which can insure that procedural due process irregularities are
corrected. "1
4
The review procedures available under Medicare may also vio-
late equal protection principles."15 The existing procedures give far
more rights to providers of services than to recipients."I6 Since no
suspect classification or protected interest is present, however, a ra-
tional basis for discrimination between these two classes is all that is
necessary." 7 The government's rationale for giving providers greater
rights is that their claims are more substantial than individuals and
thus less taxing on fiscal and administrative resources."i8 The inter-
ests of the individual, however, seem weightier than those of the pro-
vider. If an individual is denied treatment by a UR Committee, he
may be deprived of necessary medical care or even his life. As one
commentator notes, distinctions on the reviewability of claims based
on the potential amount in controversy are "insignificant for those
persons who can [not] afford. . . service.""I 9 In fact, the distinction
111 Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,746, at 9206 n.9 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
112 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260
(1970).
113 See Part III and notes 250-51 infra.
114 See Gardner & Greenberger,Judial Review ofAdministrative Acion and Responble Govern-
ment, 63 GEO. L.J. 7, 30 (1974) (periodic judicial rulings would initiate reform and curb
abuses) [hereinafter cited as Gardner & Greenberger].
115 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,
81-82 (1971).
116 Compare 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1980) with id §§ 405.929-.949 (1980) (Part A) and 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo (PRRB system). See also Butler, supra note 4, at 845; Utilization Review, supra
note 62, at 329.
117 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 483-87 (1970); Drs. Russi, Griffin, & Snell Ltd. v. Matthews, 438 F. Supp. 1036, 1043
(E.D. Va. 1977).
118 438 F. Supp. at 1043.
119 See Butler, supra note 4, at 846. While the author is referring to the Part A/Part B
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appears even less plausible when comparing the Part A beneficiary's
rights with the provider's status. Medicare was designed to provide
care for the beneficiary, yet the provider is given more extensive
rights. In the UR Committee context, the distinction is carried to its
most illogical extreme by giving the patient-beneficiary no rights and
allowing the medical profession complete control over the decision.
While the success of an equal protection challenge is doubtful, a per-
suasive argument can still be made.
Finally, one commentator has argued that inadequate review
procedures may violate the patient's right to privacy)t20 Again, the
extension of the right to privacy into the Medicare field is unlikely,
but adding those facets of the patient's rights into the balance sup-
ports the argument for adequate due process protections.
21
B. Benefciay Appeals under Medicare Part B
Medicare provides inadequate administrative and judicial re-
view for beneficiary disputes under Part B. After a beneficiary has
received services, a claim is submitted to the carrier for reimburse-
ment.1 22 The carrier makes an initial determination as to whether
the treatment is covered and the amount that will be reimbursed.123
Medicare requires the carrier to provide an appeals process.' 24 A dis-
appointed beneficiary may request an administrative review within
six months of the initial determination125 and submit additional evi-
dence to the carrier.'
26
If the beneficiary or physician is dissatisfied with the review de-
termination, either can request a hearing if the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $100.127 The carrier is responsible for appointing an
impartial hearing officer to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.128 Al-
though the beneficiary is allowed to present argument and evidence,
distinction, her contentions should hold just as true where the distinction is within the same
program.
120 See Utilization Review, supra note 64, at 329.
121 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (dealing with a woman's right to privacy in
pregnancy-related medical decisions).
122 42 U.S.C. § 1395n (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.250 (1980). The physician can take the
beneficiary's claim by assignment.
123 42 C.F.R. § 405.803(a) (1980).
124 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.801(a) (1980).
125 42 C.F.R. § 405.807 (1980).
126 Id § 405.809.
127 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.820-.821 (1980).
128 42 C.F.R. § 405.823-.830 (1980).
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the hearing officer has no subpoena power to assist him. 129 More-
over, the hearing officer's decision is final and binding upon the par-
ties with review neither to HHS nor, arguably, the courts.
130
The requirements of the due process clause apply to beneficiary
appeals under Part B if the existence of state action and a protected
interest are established. 131 As in the UR Committee situation, the
carrier's actions on behalf of the Secretary satisfy the state action re-
quirement. 32 The protected interest of a Part B beneficiary arises
from his statutory 33 and contractual 34 rights to receive Medicare
benefits. Since both requirements are met, the Part B beneficiary is
entitled to the protection afforded by the fifth amendment due pro-
cess clause.
Eldridge requires the courts to consider the government's fiscal
and administrative burdens when balancing the private and govern-
mental interests involved in a due process question. Part B claims
are potentially numerous and small. 135 Congress's concern over the
potential costs of litigating these claims prompted the adoption of
more perfunctory methods of deciding disputes.'3 6 Nonetheless, the
potential cost of handling these disputes could not be much greater
than for disability disputes for which the Supreme Court required far
greater due process protections. 37 At present there are at least three
due process problems in Part B beneficiary appeals, including:
(1) the lack of an impartial hearing officer; (2) the unavailability of
129 Id § 405.830. See Butler, supra note 4, at 845.
130 42 C.F.R. § 405.835 (1980). See Butler, supra note 4, at 846. But see Part III infra;
Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1124-26 (10th Cir. 1973) (pre-Sa.ft case finding juris-
diction to review Part B claims). The Medicare Act itself makes no provision for review of
Part B amount in controversy questions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1976). Nevertheless, several
courts have recently held that jurisdiction exists to review the legality of Part B decisions. See
Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 586-87 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S.
Ct. 2312 (1981); Leduc v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 588, 589-90 (D. Mass. 1980).
131 See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
132 See notes 20, 21, 31 & 53 supra.
133 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
134 Part B is a quasi-private health plan in which the government has a substantial inter-
est. The Part B beneficiary elects the plan and pays fees for coverage--almost surely without
an understanding that there is no review process available.
135 See S. REP. No. 404,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1995; Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc),
cart. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981); Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v. Matthews, 438 F.
Supp. 1036, 1043-44 (E.D. Va. 1977).
136 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1995.
137 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). See also Chelsea Community Hosp. v.
Michigan Blue Cross, 630 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting "that old workhorse,
administrative convenience").
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review for claims under $100; and (3) a potential substantive due
process violation.
1. Hearing Officer
Due process requires that a beneficiary receive an impartial
hearing. 138 The only hearing provided for Part B disputes is con-
ducted by a hearing officer designated by the carrier. Although a
particular hearing officer may be unbiased, he is nonetheless em-
ployed by the carrier. Given the finality of the carrier's decision, the
employment relationship constitutes a sufficient taint to invalidate
the current procedure.
In McClure v. Harris,139 the district court determined that vesting
unreviewable decisionmaking power in carrier-appointed hearing of-
ficers failed to meet the requirements of procedural due process. 14°
Applying the balancing test of Edridge, the delegation of final au-
thority to a suspect hearing officer violates the notion of impartiality
central to procedural due process. 141 The cost of providing an impar-
tial hearing will not be negligible. However, in light of existing safe-
guards for other Medicare issues, the government's added expense
would be comparatively small.
42
138 See generaly SCHWARTZ, supra note 62, at § 67.
139 503 F. Supp. 409, 418 (N.D. Cal. 1980), prob. firis, noted sub. noa. Schweiker v. Mc-
Clure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. &
MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981).
140 Id at 417. However, the court noted that the use of a biased privately appointed
hearing officer at the preliminary stages of review may be constitutional. Subsequently, the
court ordered HHS to provide all Medicare Part B beneficiaries dissatisfied with determina-
tions made regarding their claims (on or after May 1, 1980) with de now hearings conducted
by an Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security Administration. McClure v.
Schweiker, 4 MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,066 (N.D. Cal., 1981) (order for stay denied).
That decision was subsequently stayed by Circuit Justice Rehnquist. [1981-1 Transfer
Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (June 12, 1981).
141 503 F. Supp. at 415-17.
142 The court stated:
The government clearly has a strong interest in controlling the costs associated with
the Part B Medicare program. However, it is far from clear that the imposition of
Part A [type] hearing procedures would entail substantial additional costs. As [the
government] points out, more than 124 million Part B claims were processed by
carriers in 1978. Only a fraction of those claimants pursue their currently available
appeal remedies. . . . If an appeal to the Secretary is made available, there is no
indication that anything but an even smaller group of claimants will actually pur-
sue this additional remedy. Moreover, the cost of providing such additional rem-
edy will be minimized by the fact that the Secretary already maintains an appeals
procedure utilizing administrative law judges, for Part A claimants. . . . [That
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Both the Eighth Circuit and a district court have held that the
final decision regarding a beneficiary's eligibility cannot be rendered
by a private organization. 43 In McClure the district court stated:
"With all due respect for the personal integrity of Part B hearing
officers, this court finds that their impartiality is compromised by vir-
tue of both prior involvement and pecuniary interests."'" The court
found that although hearing officers are disqualified if they have had
prior involvement with a particular case, five out of seven hearing
officers had been previously employed by the carrier. 145 Additibn-
ally, hearing officers are trained by the carrier. 146 As to pecuniary
interests, although hearing officers are paid with federal funds, their
incomes are "dependent upon the carrier's decision regarding
whether, and how often, to call upon their services."
147
A further reason to question the impartiality of carrier-app-
pointed hearing officers is the inherent conflict of interest facing car-
riers and intermediaries. In Faith Hospital Association v. United
States, 48 the Court of Claims held that a regulation dealing with the
allocation of the cost of ancillary hospital services between Parts A
and B' 49 was both internally inconsistent'50 and, as applied, contrary
to the Medicare laws. 15' The court found that the parties' erroneous
interpretation of the regulation was partially attributable to the ad-
vice of the intermediary and carrier: "The 'fault' in this instance
may also lie with the fiscal intermediary and carrier. . . . The prob-
lem could lie in the inherent conflict an insurer of both private [non-
medicare] and public medical funds possesses."'
' 52
The carrier and intermediary are responsible for advising Medi-
143 St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 293 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 977 (1976); Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125,
140 (N.D. 11. 1975). Cf Davis v. Department of HEW, 416 F. Supp. 448, 451-53 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (not reaching question).
144 503 F. Supp. at 414.
145 Id The court pointed out that such a connection would violate Canon 3-C of the
Code of Judicial Conduct recognized by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id at
414-15.
146 Id at 415.
147 Id The Eighth Circuit stated in a similar context, "[t]he intangible effect of institu-
tional loyalty must not be underestimated simply because it is difficult to quantify. As Justice
Jackson commented, 'men are more often bribed by their loyalties and ambitions than by
money.'" St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 293 n. 11 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
148 634 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
149 42 C.F.R. § 405.486 (1980).
150 634 F.2d at 536.
151 Id at 537.
152 Id
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care participants and also adjudicating any violations-violations
often caused by adhering to the advice given initially by the interme-
diary or carrier. Moreover, the carrier and intermediary, as private
insurance companies, have an interest in expanding Medicare cover-
age.153 If Medicare absorbs a greater portion of the overall medical
costs, the amount which privately insured patients are charged
should be reduced accordingly. To the extent that Medicare subsi-
dizes privately insured patients, the insurance companies enjoy lower
costs and higher profits. Hearing officers' decisions often determine
the scope of Medicare coverage. The appointment of hearing officers
by insurers with a direct pecuniary interest in their decisions ad-
versely affects the impartiality required for a proper hearing.
The lack of an impartial hearing officer might be cured by in-
dependent agency or judicial review. 154 Agency review, however, is
unobtainable. Even if it were available, several recent cases indicate
that it would be inadequate. 155 The presence of judicial review is
uncertain but probably more available for Part B decisions than for
UR Committee decisions under Part A. Recently, several courts
have held that jurisdiction exists to review Part B claims. 156 The gov-
ernment's interest in preventing extensive administrative or judicial
review is to avoid the cost of extensive proceedings involving intricate
medical decisions and factual problems. In the absence of more elab-
orate procedural safeguards, however, the Constitution requires the
government to provide an independent, impartial hearing officer.
157
153 Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 585 F.2d 474 (Ct. Cl. 1978). For instance, in this
previous Faith Hospital case, it appeared that the hospital was able to lower its overall medical
costs due to the arrangement approved by the intermediary. Due to these lower costs, the
intermediary should have been reimbursing its private insureds at a lower rate and making a
greater profit.
154 See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.01, at 408 (1958). See aLso Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (procedural due process satisfied by availability of com-
mon law remedies).
155 See Sun City Community Hosp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 997, 998-99 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477, 484-85 (Ct. Cl. 1980). One district court
determined that the plaintiffs failed to receive a fair hearing because the Secretary usurped
the hearing officer's discretion by using unpromulgated yet internally controlling manuals
and policies. Leduc v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 588 (D. Mass. 1980). The Court of Claims has
criticized this problem but avoided resolving it. Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616
F.2d 477, 485 n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 585 F.2d 474, 482 n.9
(Ct. Cl. 1978). But see St. Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, [1981-1 Transfer Binder]
MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,047, at 10,264 n.19 (Ct. Cl. May 6, 1981).
156 Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312
(1981); Leduc v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 588, 589 (D. Mass. 1980).
157 A second procedural problem in Part B hearings is the failure to provide the hearing
officer with subpoena power. Carrier, hospital or physician records may be relevant to the
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2. Part A and B Claims of Less than $100
For claims under both Part A and Part B amounting to less than
$100, HHS regulations provide for an initial determination by the
intermediary or carrier.158 Medicare claimants are given notice of
that determination and a dissatisfied claimant may request review by
a second intermediary or carrier employee. 59 No additional review
is currently available.
In Gray Panthers v. Schweiker' 60 the D.C. Circuit recently ex-
amined the constitutionality of these administrative procedures for
claims of less than $100. The court held that the current notice and
paper hearing procedures were inadequate. 161 For delineation of the
particular procedures required, however, the D.C. Circuit remanded
the case for an application of the balancing test called for by
Eldridge .1
62
The need for an oral hearing is discussed in Gray Panthers. The
D.C. Circuit noted that oral hearings meet at least three policy goals:
"the desire for accuracy, the need for accountability, and the neces-
sity for a decisionmaking procedure which is perceived as 'fair.' "163
beneficiary's case but unavailable without compulsion. The subpoena power is integral to the
judicial process and most agency hearings allow for its use. SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at § 47;
Butler, supra note 4, at 845. Given the lack of independent HHS or judicial reviews, the
provision of the subpoena power would improve present procedures with little cost resulting
to the government.
158 Set Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,746, at 9192 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
159 Id at 9208 n.16 (facsimile of form reprinted); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.710-.717 (Part A),
405.807-.812 (Part B) (1980).
160 [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 30,746 (D.C..Cir. May 18,
1981). The court also noted the statutory limitation prohibiting hearings on claims of less
than $100. Nevertheless, as the legislative history makes clear, that limitation was intended to
preclude only full formal hearings.
161 Id at 9194.
162 Id "Experience under the program indicates that the holding of a full fair hearing is
unwarranted in cases where the amount in controversy is relatively small." S. REP. No. 1230,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 213 (1972).
163 [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 30,746, at 9192, 9205. In an
analogous situation, the Supreme Court considered a paper review inadequate due to its lack
of flexibility. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). The Court stated:
Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the edu-
cational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain profes-
sional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral
presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues
the decision maker appears to regard as important.
Id Though all Medicare beneficiaries are not necessarily poor as in Goldberg, as a general
rule, the aged and disabled have less money than most citizens and significantly greater medi-
cal costs. Additionally, unlike the poori the aged and disabled are likely to have communica-
tional disabilities such as being blind, deaf, senile or unable to respond in writing due to
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Medical diagnosis requires oral communication and many diagnoses
or issues of reasonableness are not quantifiable on paper.1 64 This
need for a dialogue with the final decisionmaker extends throughout
the Medicare system.
Even when the amount in controversy is less than $100, vesting
final decisionmaking power in a carrier or intermediary employee
must be considered highly suspect. As exemplified by Faith Hospital,
carriers and intermediaries have an inherent conflict of interest in the
administration of Medicare. 165 The review of claims of less than
$100 is performed by employees of these organizations without even
the semblance of independence present in McClure.166 The cost of
having an HHS administrative law judge perform a second paper
review or an informal oral hearing would be minimal. Since HHS
already pays for the costs of these reviews when they are made by
carriers or intermediaries, there should be little added cost in having
the review performed by an independent party.167
Finally, even for claims under $100, the claimant should be pro-
vided with adequate notice of the reasons for any denial.168 Ade-
quate notice should delineate the issues sufficiently to allow the
claimant to gather and present appropriate evidence. Detailed no-
tice will often satisfy the claimant while a scant form notice may only
raise the need for explanation. There would probably be little added
cost in specifying the reasons for a denial.
3. Substantive Due Process
One commentator has argued that the different treatment ac-
corded Parts A and B claimants violates substantive due process.1
69
As outlined above, significantly lower levels of administrative and
severe arthritis or muscular disorders. It is these very conditions, among others, which led to
the enactment of Medicare. See Jones, supra note 49, at 484.
164 [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 30,746, at 9205.
165 See text accompanying notes 148-57 supra.
166 See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980), prob. juiri, noted sub nom.
Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay granted, [1981-1 Transfer
Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12, 1981).
167 The best procedure would be to have an administrative law judge review the claims in
an informal setting rather than an HHS employee who is subject to greater institutional
pressures that could sway the decision. See, e.g., McClure v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer
Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 31,066 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 1981), stay granted, [1981-1
Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, June 12,
1981). HHS already performs the review itself if no intermediary is chosen.
168 See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE
(CCH) 1 30,746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
169 See Butler, supra note 4, at 846.
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judicial review are available under Part B. The justification for this
disparity is that smaller sums are generally involved under Part B
and therefore, the relative cost to the government of providing more
extensive review would be greater. 170 Since Part B claimants pay for
their subsidized insurance it can be argued that they should have
greater rights than Part A beneficiaries. No "fundamental right"' 7 t
or "suspect classification"' 172 is involved, however, and therefore, the
government is only required to show a rational basis for its distinc-
tion. 173 While such a level of scrutiny is low, it is not meaningless.
174
Nevertheless, the probability of success under a substantive due pro-
cess argument is minimal. 75 The more troubling distinction be-
tween Part A and B is the potential preclusion of judicial review for
legal and constitutional claims arising under Part B. As will be dis-
cussed in part III, such a limitation is of doubtful constitutional va-
lidity but for reasons beyond substantive due process.
176
4. A Practical Proposal
Generally, the distinction between Part A and Part B review is
based on the supposition that Part A will give rise to substantially
larger claims and, by comparison, Part B claims will be too costly to
review. 177 Congress, however, has authorized physicians to take as-
signments from their patients and then collect from Medicare. 78 If a
physician was allowed to aggregate the claims of several patients, the
170 Id at 846.
171 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to travel). See also
TRIBE, supra note 42, at § 16-7; Barrett,Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifatios-A More
Modest Role for Equal Protection? 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89 [hereinafter cited as Barrett].
172 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). See also TRIBE, supra
note 42, at § 16-13.
173 See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
174 Id The Court invalidated the provision differentiating between households of related
persons which were allowed benefits and households containing unrelated persons which were
denied benefits. The Court found the distinction irrational. The provision failed to further
congressional nutrition goals and was aimed at unpopular political groups such as "hippies."
Compare Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (dealing with family associa-
tional rights) with Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (dealing with general
associational interests). See also Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
175 It is useful to note Professor Tribe's argument that the Supreme Court in Goldberg
implicitly recognized an underlying substantive right to subsistence once a welfare program
has been established. TRIBE, sufira note 42, at 1116-17. Thus, welfare recipients, including
medicare beneficiaries have a quasi-fundamental right subject to protection. But see Barrett,
supra note 171, at 90-93.
176 See notes 217-331 and accompanying text infra.
177 See notes 135-36 supra.
178 42 U.S.C. § 1395n (1976).
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amount in controversy could equal or exceed the provider claims. 179
The government's interest in preventing piecemeal litigation could
be furthered by making the physician responsible for litigating his
aggregate claims rather than providing a series of hearings for the
beneficiaries' smaller claims. To further this goal, HHS or Congress
could set a dollar limitation to insure that fiscal and administrative
burdens are minimized.
180
Granting physicians greater rights when contesting aggregated
claims possibly violates the beneficiary's substantive due process
rights. There is, however, a legitimate, although not controlling, gov-
ernmental interest in protecting fiscal and administrative resources.
In addition, providing review of aggregated physician claims would
arguably increase the availability of health care to beneficiaries and
shift much of the risk of loss to physicians. When a physician refuses
to take an assignment from the beneficiary, the latter is forced to
make the initial payment. An elderly or indigent patient may thus
be precluded from treatment. 18 1 Since many physicians refuse to
take assignments, t82 Medicare beneficiaries would arguably receive
better care if physicians had greater rights under the assignments and
could seek fuller review of carrier decisions. Encouraging physicians
to take assignments would also shift some of the financial responsibil-
ity for making medical judgments to the physician. In terms of new,
less accepted treatments it would be the physician's rather than the
beneficiary's responsibility to litigate the allowability of the treat-
ment and its cost with the carrier. 18 3 Thus, greater review for aggre-
gated claims by physicians should be encouraged and placed on a
par with provider reimbursement disputes.
179 See Berdick v. United States, 612 F.2d 533 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Cervoni v. Secretary of
HEW, 581 F.2d 1010 (lst Cir. 1978); Kechijian v. Califano, 458 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1978);
Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v. Matthews, 438 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Va. 1977).
180 Dollar limitations have been imposed on provider review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395o0
(1976) (setting forth provider limits). Aggregate claims for physicians under Part B might be
set at a lower limit.
181 See Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1124-26 (10th Cir. 1973).
182 See Butler, supra note 4, at 143 n.46.
183 See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Although it
involves Part A charges, Sacred Heart provides an excellent example of the type of claim re-
quiring aggregation. The hospital had completely reorganized the administration of its in-
halation therapy department along new, unconventional lines. Despite a dramatic reduction
in overall inhalation therapy costs, the fiscal intermediary denied the administrative costs be-
cause they were not in line with other, albeit more expensive, hospitals. It is unlikely that
each beneficiary could have litigated the issues involved. Fortunately, the provider had suffi-
cient economic interest and expertise to challenge the fiscal intermediary and to prove its
point. Similarly, in terms of economics and proof, a heart specialist who performs a new
operation on several patients can more readily challenge a carrier or HHS.
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C. Beneftciag Appeals-Part A
After a beneficiary receives services under Part A, the fiscal in-
termediary must determine whether the service is covered by Medi-
care.' 84 The beneficiary is entitled to notice of adverse decisions
85
and can request a redetermination. 186 A beneficiary dissatisfied with
the redetermination can request a hearing before an administrative
law judge (ALJ) if the amount in controversy exceeds $100.187
At the hearing, the beneficiary is allowed to appear, present evi-
dence and make oral arguments.'88 The ALJ has the power to issue
subpoenas, take evidence and swear witnesses. 189 The ALJ must
make a decision based on the record which is reviewable only on the
facts. 190 An adverse decision may be presented to the Appeals Coun-
cil191 which can take new evidence and render a decision. 92 The
decisions of the Appeals Council are considered final administrative
actions193 and reviewable in district court if the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $1,000.194
While the Part A beneficiary appeals procedure is considerably
more thorough than either the UR Committee or Part B review pro-
cedures, several problems do exist. As in Part B review proceedings,
an irrational distinction is made between the reviewability of facts
and law. Although Congress intended to prevent overwhelming the
courts with examinations of individual factual questions, it did not
mean to prevent review of the legality of agency decisions. Since this
is a problem primarily associated with judicial review, it will be con-
sidered further in part III.'95
In a Part A review the ALJ is not associated with the private
intermediary so a direct conflict of interest does not arise. Addition-
ally, independent judicial review is available for substantial disputes.
184 42 C.F.R. § 405.702 (1980).
185 Id
186 Id § 405.710.
187 Id § 405.720; 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1981). See text accompanying notes 158-68 supra
for discussion concluding more adequate procedures must be provided for claims involving
less than $100 under Part A.
188 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.949 (1981).
189 Id
190 Id § 404.953 (1981).
191 Id § 404.967 (1981).
192 Id §§ 404.976, .979 (1981). Although the beneficiary technically has a right to appear
before the Appeals Council, this right is largely theoretical since the Council only meets in
Arlington, Virginia. See Butler, sufira note 4, at 143.
193 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1981).
194 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1) (1976).
195 See notes 217-331 and accompanying text infia.
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Subpoena power is also available so that a beneficiary can compel
the production of witnesses and evidence.
The provision of these procedural safeguards for Part A benefi-
ciaries raises the question of whether the lack of similar safeguards
for Part B beneficiaries is a denial of substantive due process. While
the two groups substantially overlap, less protection is given to Part
B beneficiaries who have paid for the insurance coverage. The Medi-
care program thus insulates many decisions which would be review-
able in the private insurance and health care system. If impartial
administrative review can be provided for all Part A beneficiary
claims involving more than $100, and further judicial review for
claims greater than $1,000, there is no rational reason for denying the
same procedural due process to Part B beneficiaries. Both programs
deal with equally important liberty and property interests. In fact,
the Part B beneficiary's property interest is greater because he makes
a direct contribution of insurance premiums.
The availability of judicial review is a factor to consider in as-
sessing the adequacy of administrative review. In Eldridge, the
Supreme Court intimated that the lack of procedural safeguards sur-
rounding the termination of beneficiaries' disability payments was
counterbalanced by the availability of independent judicial re-
view. 196 When judicial review is seriously limited or unavailable, ad-
ministrative review mechanisms should be required to provide
greater protection of the beneficiaries' due process rights. Given the
direct provision of judicial review for Part A beneficiaries and the
apparent absence of review for Part B beneficiaries, the lack of mini-
mal procedural safeguards in Part B is particularly suspect.
D. Provider Reimbursement
Providers are reimbursed throughout the year based on an esti-
mate of their reasonable costs. Final adjustments are made to their
reasonable cost reimbursement based upon an audit of their year-end
fiscal reports.1 97 Disputes involving the amount of provider reim-
bursement are handled by a two-level administrative review
system. 198
196 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976). Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 762 (1975) (judicial review available) with Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373
(1974) (no judicial review provided in statutes).
197 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803 (1980).
198 The existing review system provides one level of review for claims of $1,000 to $10,000,
see note 199 injra, and another for claims above $10,000. See notes 208-09 in ifa. No review is
provided for claims of less than $1,000. This raises some of the questions previously discussed
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1. Claims of $1,000 to $10,000
For claims of $1,000 to $10,000, upon receiving notice of an ad-
verse determination, the provider may request a hearing from the
intermediary.' 99 The intermediary appoints a hearing officer or
panel to hear the dispute.2°° While discovery is available, subpoenas
are not.20' The decision must be on the record and is final. 202 Never-
theless, judicial review is arguably available in the Court of Claims
and district courts.20 3 While judicial review cures certain defects, the
better approach would be to reform the administrative system.
Review by intermediary-appointed hearing officers infringes
upon the provider's right to a fair and impartial hearing.20 4 As Faith
Hospital indicated, intermediaries have an inherent conflict of inter-
est in their advising and review functions.20 5 Similarly, the district
court in McClure concluded that carrier-appointed hearing officers
were not sufficiently impartial to make a final decision.20 6 Thus, the
provision of a second, independent review process is necessary to ful-
fill due process requirements. 20 7
2. Provider Reimbursement Review Board-Claims of $10,000 or
More
For claims of at least $10,000, Congress has established the Pro-
vider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB)20 8 to handle disputes.
If a group of providers have aggregate claims exceeding $50,000,
regarding review of minimal claims. See text accompanying notes 158-68 supra. In contrast to
beneficiaries, however, providers have less important interests since only their property rights
are at stake.
199 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(B); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1803-.1813 (1980). Seegeneraly Butler,
supra note 4, at 835-36. Medicare contains no specific mechanism to review provider claims of
less than $1,000. Many of the same considerations examined in connection with beneficiary
claims of less than $100 are applicable to provider claims of less than $1,000.
200 42 C.F.R. § 405.1817 (1980).
201 Butler, supra note 4, at 845.
202 42 C.F.R. § 405.1831-.1833 (1980).
203 See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477, 482 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Court of
Claims assumed jurisdiction over post-1973 provider claim because no other avenue of relief
available at the time the claim was filed).
204 See text accompanying notes 138-57 supra.
205 See text accompanying notes 151-61 supra.
206 See text accompanying notes 141-50 supra.
207 Judicial review of the applicable legal standards seems imperative. Note the recent
Court of Claims cases where the hearing officer properly followed the Medicare provisions
only to be improperly revised by HHS. Sun City Community Hosp. v. United States, 624
F.2d 997, 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl.
1980).
208 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(2) (1976).
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which contain common questions of law and fact, then PRRB review
is also available.20 9 The provider has the right to appear, be repre-
sented by counsel, present evidence and witnesses, and use PRRB
subpoena power. The PRRB is comprised of five members, at least
three of whom have no relationship with the intermediaries o.2 0 The
PRRB makes a de novo determination of the issues and facts.2I' The
decision is final unless modified or reversed by the Secretary, and
judicial review is available in the district courts.
212
The presence of the PRRB for Part A providers suggests the pos-
sibility of giving similar protections to the aggregated claims of Part
B physicians. The PRRB procedure allows for a streamlined, in-
dependent review of the factual difficulties inherent in Medicare
cases, yet allows for important judicial review of the procedures used
and law applied by the board and HHS.
The PRRB procedure meets all due process requirements.2'3
Thus, it provides an excellent model for review in other Medicare
areas. UR Committee decisions, Part B beneficiary disputes and
Part A issues could all be made ultimately appealable to an in-
dependent board or to the PRRB. The due process problems en-
countered in using intermediaries and carriers to adjudicate disputes
would thus be substantially reduced. In addition, the legal issues
presented should be ultimately appealable to the judiciary.
Throughout the Medicare area, little direct review is provided
for legal issues. 21 4 In precluding judicial review of legal issues, Con-
gress allows the agency to self-define its limits and role.2 1 5 While
there may be a legitimate governmental interest in minimizing the
extent to which factual questions are reviewed-particularly in
209 Id § 1395oo(b). See Glendale Adventist Medical Center v. Schweiker, [1980-81 Trans-
fer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,988 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1981) (providers can
aggregate cost reports from more than one year to meet the $50,000 requirement). Cleveland
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1979) (The PRRB refused to review
a group claim aggregating $50,000 from several fiscal years because the regulations required
that aggregated claims must all arise in the same year. The court reversed based on legisla-
tive history indicating aggregation could be from more than one year.)
210 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(h) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1845 (1980). The lack of an independ-
ent review raises a due process question as to whether the provider is receiving an impartial,
and hence constitutional, hearing. See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Cal. 1980),
prob.jueris. noted sub noa. Schweiker v. McClure, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981), stay
granted, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,089 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice, June 12, 1981).
211 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1869-.1871 (1980).
212 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1875-.1877 (1980).
213 But see Homer & Platten, supra note 17, at 123-32 (criticizing the PRRB regulations).
214 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 405(h), 1395ff, 1395oo (1976).
215 See Gardner & Greenberger, supra note 114.
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technical fields such as medicine-even in those circumstances, the
usual standard of administrative review must apply to prevent arbi-
trary or capricious agency action.2 16 As the next section will detail,
judicial review of Medicare issues is confusing, uncertain and badly
in need of congressional revision.
E. Summagy
A survey of the administrative review available to Medicare
providers and beneficiaries reveals significant due process inadequa-
cies and a maze of confusing procedures through which claimants
must maneuver. Congress, in enacting Medicare, elected to use pri-
vate insurers to augment administration of the program. The inher-
ent dual role and conflict of interest of these insurers necessitates
independent review. Recognizing the importance of medical care
and the advanced age of most beneficiaries, independent review
should not be so far removed as to make it unrealistic. Additionally,
a disparity exists between the extent and nature of the review avail-
able to beneficiaries and providers. Generally, the individual is sacri-
ficed rather than the institution. Given the grave nature of the
interests at stake and the government's ability to provide review for
many Medicare claims, such irrational distinctions should be
eliminated.
III. Judicial Review
The inadequacy of Medicare's administrative procedures creates
the need for an efficient judicial review mechanism.2t 7 Whether by
design or oversight,2 I however, Congress limited the availability, of
216 See, e.g., Sun City Community Hosp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 997, 1001 (Ct. Cl.
1980); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
217 The need for judicial review is exemplified by the frequent beneficiary and provider
challenges to agency actions in light of the regulations, e.g., Hospital San Jorge Inc. v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 616 F.2d 580 (lst Cir. 1980); statutory authority, e.g., Faith Hosp., Inc. v.
United States, 634 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1980); and the Constitution, e.g., St. Louis Univ. Hosp. v.
Blue Cross Hosp., 537 F.2d 283, 291-93 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision by private Provider Appeals
Committee). As a practical matter, decisions delegated to private organizations may consti-
tute "final decisions" by the Secretary. Thus they are reviewable by the courts. At least one
court has specifically recognized this finality where a constitutional question was presented
but no jurisdictional questions raised. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder]
MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,746, at 9195. Pushkin v. Califano, 600 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1979) (equal protection claim by optometrists); Leduc v. Harris, 4 MED. & MED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,721 (D. Mass., Jan. 9, 1980) (due process challenge in Part B); Caylor-Nickel
Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 4 MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 30,718 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
218 See, e.g., Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th
Cir. 1980). 0
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judicial review of Medicare issues.219 The Medicare Act itself pro-
vides judicial review only for: (1) the Secretary's final decisions on
individual eligibility;220 (2) Part A benefit determinations involving
more than $1,000;22t and (3) PRRB cost reimbursement decisions in-
volving at least $10,000.222
Congress also incorporated into the Medicare Act section 205(h)
219 Congress's primary concern in regulating the scope of judicial review was to prevent
overburdening the Secretary and the courts with small claims involving factual and technical
medical issues. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 54-55, reprnted in [1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEwS 1943, 1995. See also 118 CONG. REc. 33992 (1972). See general'y Erika,
Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312
(1981).
As a practical matter, however, nearly all the cases have dealt with traditionally review-
able questions of agency compliance with the law or Constitution. See, e.g., Chelsea Commu-
nity Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980) (whether Secretary
could delegate final adjudicatory power to a private body); Faith Hosp., Inc. v. United States,
634 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (regulation arbitrary and capricious).
220 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1976) provides:
(a) Entitlement to and amount of benefits
The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part
A or part B, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A, shall be
made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him.
(b) Appeal by individuals
(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a)
of this section as to-
(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or section 426a
of this title, or
(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the
provisions of part B of this subchapter, or section 1395i-2 of this title, or
section 1819, or
(C) the amount of benefits under part A (including a determina-
tion where such amount is determined to be zero)
shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is
provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary's final
decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of
this subsection, a hearing shall not be available to an individual by reason of such
subparagraph (C) if the amount in controversy is less than $100; nor shall judicial
review be available to an individual by reason of such subparagraph (C) if the
amount in controversy is less than $1,000.
(c) Appeal by institutions or agencies
Any institution or agency dissatisfied with any determination by the Secretary
that it is not a provider of services, or with any determination described in section
1395cc(b)(2) of this title, shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary
(after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing) to the same extent as is pro-
vided in section 405(b) of this title, and to judicial review of the Secretary's final
decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.
221 Id
222 Id § 1395oo. Congress added the PRRB in 1973. A group of providers with an aggre-
gate claim of $50,000 or more may also seek review if common questions of law or fact are
involved. See generally Homer & Platten, supra note 17; Butler, supra note 4.
[October 19811
REVIEW OF MEDICARE ISSUES
of the Social Security Act 223 "as applicable. '224 Section 205(h) reads:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hear-
ing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secre-
tary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under sec-
tions 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under
this subchapter.225
Under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 226 all final deci-
sions of the Secretary are ultimately reviewable. 227 Section 205(g),
however, was not included in the Medicare Act. Consequently, un-
certainty exists concerning the scope of section 205(h) and the availa-
bility of judicial review for Medicare issues not addressed by the
statutes. 228 Thus, courts have had to struggle with the effect of sec-
tion 205(h) on their ability to review Medicare disputes under tradi-
tional bases of jurisdiction such as federal question jurisdiction,
229
mandamus, 230 the Administrative Procedure Act, 23' and the Tucker
223 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
224 Id § 1395ii.
225 Id § 405(h).
226 Id § 405(g).
227 The section provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action.
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evi-
dence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary or a
decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an indi-
vidual who was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, because of failure of the
claimant or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation pre-
scribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question
of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations.
The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to re-
view in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
228 Examples of issues left unaddressed by the Medicare review provisions include Part B
amount determinations, pre-1973 provider reimbursement claims and post-1973 claims of less
than $10,000. There is also no provision for review of the Secretary's failure to make a "final
decision." This problem is particularly common when authority is delegated to private par-
ties. Se, e.g., St. Louis Univ. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Hosp., 537 F.2d 283, 291-93 (8th Cir. 1976).
At least one court has held that a delegation of a decision to a private organization may
constitute a "final decision." See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED.
& MED. GUIDE (CCH) % 30,746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1981).
229 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
230 Id § 1361.
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Act. 2 3 2
This section of the article will examine the major Supreme
Court decision concerning judicial review under section 205(h) and
the questions left unanswered by that decision. The section will con-
clude with analyses of the availability of judicial review in the Court
of Claims and district courts.
A. Weinberger v. Salfi
In 1974, the Supreme Court considered the effect of section
205(h) on judicial review in Weinberger v. Sa(/. 233 The case involved a
claim for widows' and childrens' Social Security benefits.2 34 The So-
cial Security Act contained an irrebuttable presumption that wives
or step-children of less than nine months were not entitled to depen-
dents benefits.2 35 A widow who had been married to the deceased
wage earner for six months brought suit challenging the irrebuttable
presumption as unconstitutional.2 36 A three-judge district court con-
cluded that it had federal question jurisdiction and that the statute
was unconstitutional.2 37 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the district court was barred from taking federal question jurisdiction
by section 205(h).
Until Sao, most courts considered section 205(h) merely to re-
quire an exhaustion of administrative remedies. 238 The Supreme
Court focused, however, on the third sentence of 205(h) which reads:
"[N]o action against the United States, the Secretary or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under [sections 1331 and 1361] of
Title 28 to recover on any claim [arising under Title II of the Social
Security Act].12 3 9 Justice Rehnquist stressed that the phrase "no ac-
tion" was "sweeping and direct" and covered any action under Title
11.240 According to the Court, any other construction would render
section 205(h) superfluous since the first two sentences of section
231 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
232 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
233 422 U.S. 749 (1974).
234 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) (children's benefits), 4 02(g)(1) (widow's benefits) (1976).
235 Id § 416(c), (e).
236 422 U.S. at 753.
237 Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 749 (1974).
238 373 F. Supp. at 964. See Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d
663 (2d Cir. 1973); Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971); Cappadora v.
Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).
239 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
240 422 U.S. at 757.
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205(h) assured administrative exhaustion.241 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that only those claims cognizable under section 205(g) could
be reviewed in district court.
2 42
Sa/f also raised the question of the extent to which Congress can
preclude judicial review of constitutional questions. Plaintiff argued
that her claim was not barred by section 205(h) because it arose
under the Constitution, and not under Title II of the Social Security
Act.243 Plaintiff's argument was based, in part, on Johnson v. Robi-
son,244 in which the Court had concluded that a Veteran's Act sec-
tion comparable to section 205(h) did not bar review of
constitutional issues.
2 45
Justice Rehnquist avoidedJohnson by concluding that the claims
were based solely on Title II. The Court stated, "[N]ot only is it
Social Security benefits which appellees seek to recover, but it is the
Social Security Act which provides both the standing and the sub-
stantive basis for the presentation of their constitutional conten-
tions. '246 The Court also specifically distinguished Johnson. The
Court noted that the statute in Johnson only precluded review of the
Administrator's decisions, whereas the plaintiffs challenge in that case
was to an act of Congress. By contrast, in Sa , section 205(h) was
held to preclude judicial consideration of any action to recover on a
claim.24
7
The more important distinction between Sa6i and johnson is that
in Johnson, if the statute were read differently, no judicial review
would be available on constitutional questions. By contrast, a liti-
241 Id
242 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g).
243 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760 (1974). In some respects, Sal6 represented a
triumph for the positivist theory noted by Professor Tribe in the due process area. TRIBE,
supra note 42, at § 10-12. The positivist approach would allow Congress to limit the constitu-
tional protection accorded to rights it creates. This is not yet the majority position. Id at
§ 10-13. Moreover, it raises substantial constitutional questions involving the proper balance
of power in our government.
244 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
245 The statute considered injohnson reads:
[Tihe decisions of the [Veterans'] Administrator on any question of law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for
veterans. . . shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the
United States shall have power to review any such decision by an action in the
nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976).
246 422 U.S. at 760-61.
247 Id at 761-62. The Court's distinction seems contrived. Both cases involved challenges
to the constitutionality of a statute. A more realistic distinction is the availability of review in
Sa/6 compared to the availability of review in Johnson.
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gant could secure relief regarding the Social Security Act under sec-
tion 205(g). It is this last distinction which is most important in
Medicare because judicial review is not directly provided in many
areas.
248
Importantly, both in Johnson and Saofi, the Court said that it
would require "clear and convincing evidence" of a congressional in-
tent to preclude constitutional review.249 Serious constitutional ques-
tions would arise if a statute precluded review of claimed
constitutional violations.2 50 Although the Supreme Court has never
addressed this specific issue, it is doubtful whether any statute which
totally precluded review of constitutional questions would be found
valid.
25 1
The federal courts retain jurisdiction to determine whether
withdrawal of jurisdiction is permissible.2 52 Moreover, jurisdictional
248 Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312
(1981); Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir.
1980); Hopewell Nursing Home, Inc. v. Califano, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] MED. & MED.
GUIDE (CCH) $ 30,701 (D.S.C. 1980).
249 422 U.S. at 762; 415 U.S. at 373. Justice Brennan considered Johnson to control the
outcome in Sa6fi for several reasons. 422 U.S. at 786. He considered § 205(h) to bar review
only of eligibility determinations and cases requiring application of the statutes to particular
sets of facts. For cases challenging the validity of statutes and regulations, he argued, the
Court was imposing a futile administrative review. Moreover, the plaintiffs' claims were
based on the Constitution and did not arise under the Social Security Act.
250 See generaly P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEScHLER, HART AND WES-
CHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 313-75 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as THE FEDERAL COURTS]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES
§ 28.09 (1976); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 853-55 (1975); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialecting, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Hart).
251 See R. BORK, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS (Ameri-
can Enterprise Inst. 1972); Hart, supra note 247; Eisenberg, Constitutional Authority to Restrict
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg];
Harzenski,Jurisdictional Limitations and Suspicious Motives: Why Congress Cannot Forbid Court-Or-
dered Busing, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 14, 25 (1976); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical. Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45
(1975); Comment, CongressionalPower Over State and Federal CourtJurisdiction: The Hill-Burton and
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Examples, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131 (1974). See also Exparte Yeager, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 85 (1869) (attempt by Congress to limit federal court jurisdiction to circumvent a
substantive judicial interpretation of the Constitution was itself unconstitutional); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
[courts] to say what the law is."). Accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
But see Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
252 See THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 250: "If the court finds that what is being done
[by the government] is invalid, its duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional limitation inva-
lid also, and then proceed under the general grant of jurisdiction." Id at 348. Thus, so long
as federal courts have federal question jurisdiction, they always have the power to decide the
constitutionality of any congressional jurisdictional limitation. As one court observed, "A
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statutes operating in violation of substantive provisions of the Consti-
tution would themselves be unconstitutional.2 53 Thus, an attempt to
withdraw jurisdiction over constitutional questions might well be in-
effective. Given such a problem, it is the duty of the courts to inter-
pret a statute, such as section 205(h), in a manner which avoids an
unconstitutional result.
Following Salfl, the lower courts have been forced to deal with
the various issues Sa46 left open or created. Since Salfi did not specifi-
cally overrule Johnson, the latter case may control in particular in-
stances. Finally, the Supreme Court's statement that the issues in
Sa46 arose under Title II of the Social Security Act rather than the
Constitution seems overbroad and difficult to apply where procedu-
ral due process has been violated. Therefore, it is worth examining
how the lower courts have struggled with these issues and the various
solutions devised.
B. Court of Claims
The most consistent and well-established avenue for judicial re-
view of Medicare disputes has been through the Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.254 In Whiteliff, Inc. v. United States,255 the
Court of Claims established that it had jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act to review Medicare issues, thus reaffirming its pre-Sa/fi order in
Goldstein v. United States.2 56 The court also examined the effect of Sa46
and reconsidered the scope of section 205(h).
The plaintiff-provider in Whitec4f sued to recoup an alleged un-
basic and inherent function of the judicial branch of a government built upon a constitution
is to set aside void action by government officials. . . . In our jurisprudence, no Government
action which is void under the Constitution is exempt from judicial power." Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (citations omitted), rev'don othergrounds sub nora.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Se also R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 282 (1969) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton)).
253 See Eisenberg, supra note 251, at 523.
254 Both houses of Congress have recently passed bills creating a new United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. S. 21, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H. R. 2405, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). Those bills merge the present Court of Claims with the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals to form the new circuit. The Court of Claims Trial Division will be
reconstituted as the United States Claims Court. The Claims Court will have Tucker Act
jurisdiction plus some additions. Id. §§ 132(a) and 126(d) respectively. Appeals from the
Claims Court will then go to the new Circuit Court. Much of the analysis under this section
will remain the same. It should be noted that Congress in reenacting the new Claims Court
jurisdiction was aware of the assumption of Medicare jurisdiction. Additionally, the bills
grant declaratory relief and injunctive powers to the Claims Court which will eliminate the
current disadvantage of litigating in the Court of Claims.
255 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cer d&nied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
256 201 Ct. Cl. 888, cerL denied, 414 U.S. 947 (1973).
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derpayment withheld by Blue Cross Association's Medicare Provider
Appeals Committee. Since the claims arose prior to 1973, there was
no express provision for provider review. The court declined to ex-
tend Saft to bar Court of Claims jurisdiction because to do so
would be to prevent all review of very large categories of cases and
issues, including constitutional questions, and to accord absolute
finality to adjudications by private organizations like the BCA.
Such a result would be of doubtful constitutional validity and
would undermine the normal presumption in favor of judicial
review.
257
The Whiteclif court reaffirmed the standard of review estab-
lished in pre-Sa4f6 cases. The Court of Claims' review is limited to
determining "compliance with the Constitution, statutory provisions,
and regulations, . . . , as well as [an examination] for the taint of
arbitrariness, capriciousness, or lack of support in substantial evi-
dence. '258  Evidentiary review is allowed only to assure procedural
due process in decisionmaking. This standard of review meets Con-
gress's goal of avoiding extensive judicial review of the technical
questions presented in Medicare. 259 At the same time, the Secretary
and HHS agents are prevented from unlawfully depriving Medicare
participants of their constitutional or statutory rights.
Later developments have supported the conclusion that Medi-
care and the Tucker Act confer jurisdiction on the Court of
Claims. 26° In Chelsea Community Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross,261 the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Court of Claims' view and stressed a point
only intimated in Whitecl# The Chelsea court concluded that the
Whitecft decision properly adhered to the maxim of statutory con-
257 536 F.2d at 350.
258 Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
259 See, e.g., notes 135-36 supra. See also St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Health Servs., 357
F.2d 283, 289 (8th Cir. 1976).
260 The two acts must be considered together to find jurisdiction. Surprisingly, none of
the cases considering the Court of Claims jurisdiction in Medicare cases deal with the limita-
tions inherent in suing the sovereign and concomitant scope of the Tucker Act. In the semi-
nal case detailing the scope of the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that the Tucker Act is only a
jurisdictional statute and does not create any substantive rights. The right to recover in the
Court of Claims, Testan holds, "depends upon whether any federal statute 'can fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation . . . .'" Id at 400. Medicare claimants fall into the
group of cases resting upon an express right to payment under a federal statute-the Medi-
care Act. See Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Medicare claimants are suitable litigants in the Court of Claims because the Medicare Act
provides a right to money, and the Tucker Act provides a waiver of sovereign immunity.
261 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980).
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struction that courts should seek to interpret statutes so as to avoid
constitutional questions.2 62 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted
Justice Powell's comment in Califano v. Sanders263 that Sa6fi "merely
adhered to the well-established principle that when constitutional
questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is pre-
sumed. ' 264 Thus, Califano indicates that where, as in johnson, consti-
tutional review is seemingly precluded by a literal reading of the
statute, the courts must avoid such a construction.
The presumption in favor of judicial review generally requires
"clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude
review.2 65 As one judge of the Court of Claims has noted, if section
205(h) is a bar to Court of Claims jurisdiction, it requires finding an
implied intent on the part of Congress to partially repeal the Tucker
Act.2 66 Such a construction does not seem to meet the requirement of
"clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent necessary to
preclude review.
In Eika, Inc. v. United States ,267 the Court of Claims reexamined
its jurisdiction over Medicare issues. Erika involved a claim for bene-
fits under Part B. The government argued that Congress's failure to
provide for Part B review under section 1395h indicated an intent to
262 "We adopt the view of the Court of Claims, for it is a 'cardinal principle' that we
should seek statutory constructions which avoid constitutional doubts." Id at 1135.
263 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
264 Id at 109, quoted in 630 F.2d at 1134.
265 See, e.g., Trinity Memorial Hosp. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 570 F.2d 660, 665 (7th Cir.
1977) (finding review in Court of Claims). The Court of Claims also specifically adopted this
standard in Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cet. granted, 101 S.
Ct. 2312 (1981). The principle that preclusion ofjudicial review requires "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" of congressional intent was established in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 141 (1967). Professor Davis argues that the standard is too high in prohibiting preclusion
by implication and cites six cases with less restrictive dicta. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF' THE SEvErrTrIES § 28.09 (1976 & Supp. 1980). The Abbott decision, however, seems to
be the better view and is still good law. When the preclusion ofjudicial review is intended, at
a minimum Congress should be required to be explicit. An implied repeal of the jurisdiction
of the Tucker Act should not be given effect. See note 266 in/a.
266 Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d at 592 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Nichols, J., concurring).
Judge Nichols suggested that partial repeals of the Tucker Act by implication have been
favored, but continued:
There is, however, a big difference between an implied partial repeal of the Tucker
Act in course of providing a seemingly adequate remedy elsewhere than in this
court (actuated, perhaps, by a commendable desire to guarantee us an easy life with
long vacations) and such an implied partial repeal in course of expressly denying
relief elsewhere. Much will depend on facts, but I do not think the Supreme Court
has yet said or done anything to disable us from requiring defendant to show us
express repeal of the Tucker Act in such circumstances.
Id Thus, even assuming repeal by implication is accepted, it cannot be presumed here.
267 634 F.2d 580 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981).
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partially limit the Court of Claims' Tucker Act jurisdiction.268 Chief
Judge Friedman, writing for the court, expressly relied on Johnson
and a line of Court of Claims cases allowing review of final decisions.
The Chief Judge concluded:
If, as those cases hold, the courts may entertain constitutional and
statutory challenges to administrative action even where the gov-
erning statute explicitly bars judicial review, a fortiori, the courts
may do so where, as here, the alleged bar to judicial review is
merely implicit in the statutory language and structure.269
To find section 205(h) a bar to Tucker Act jurisdiction requires
a tortuous construction. The third sentence of section 205(h) barring
judicial review only refers to district court jurisdiction and does not
refer to the Tucker Act.270 While the Sixth Circuit argues that the
second sentence of section 205(h) could be read to preclude Court of
Claims review, such a reading would make the third sentence super-
fluous.2 7 1 A better construction would be that section 205(h) accords
finality to the Secretary's factual determinations, but also allows the
Court of Claims review of the underlying legal issues and the meth-
ods used in arriving at the decision.
Jurisdiction to review Medicare issues is well established in the
Court of Claims. Unfortunately, the court is limited in the breadth
of relief it can grant. 272 For litigants seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, the district courts are the appropriate forum if review is
available. One declaratory judgment deciding the legality of a regu-
268 634 F.2d at 585-86.
269 Id at 587.
270 See Reviser's Note, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756
n.3 (1974).
271 Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (6th
Cir. 1980). The court stated:
If § 405(h) does apply to the present controversy, it is binding on all courts; the
plain language of § 405(h) provides that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the
Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except
as herein provided" (emphasis added). We could not in good conscience hold this
section applicable and still transfer the present case to the Court of Claims; how-
ever, we do not think that § 405(h) is applicable in any way to pre-1973 provider-
reimbursement claims. Sa/fi is distinguishable: the statutory review provision pres-
ent in SaoY, and essential to &66's logic, is missing here. This is the interpretation
adopted by the Court of Claims.
Id at 1135.
272 The Court of Claims can grant declaratory relief only if the declaratory judgment is
tied to an award of monetary damages. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2 (1969);
Gentry v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 345 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Austin v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl.
719, 722-23 (1975). The court is also not empowered to grant injunctive relief. United States
v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
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lation is more economical than having numerous litigants bringing
claims based on the same faulty regulation to the Court of Claims.
273
Moreover, Court of Claims decisions have national precedential
value. Thus, Congress might do well to reevaluate the existing limi-
tations to granting full relief in the Court of Claims.
274
D. District Courts
Medicare participants attempting to bring suit in federal district
court must first find a jurisdictional basis. The Supreme Court has
eliminated the Administrative Procedure Act 275 as an independent
source ofjurisdiction.27 6 Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act
277
cannot be used as a jurisdictional basis.2 78 There has been little case
law developed on mandamus jurisdiction,2 79 and thus most litigation
has focused on the availability of federal question jurisdiction. Due
to section 205(h) and Safl6, however, federal question jurisdiction for
Medicare claims has remained uncertain.
The majority of courts have found section 205(h) to be at least a
partial bar to judicial review of Medicare decisions. 280 The crucial
273 Set Gardner & Greenberger, supra note 114, at 27-30.
274 Congress recently passed legislation granting these powers to the new United States
Claims Court. See note 254 supra.
275 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
276 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The Court stated that "the APA is not to be
interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency decisions." Id
at 105. See Rhode Island Hosp. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 1153, 1156 n.l (1st Cir. 1978). Cf.
Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1080-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (§ 1331
jurisdiction to review violation of APA notice and comment requirements).
277 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (Supp. 1980).
278 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
279 The only real discussion of the availability of mandamus jurisdiction is dictum by the
D.C. Circuit that mandamus may exist in certain circumstances. See Association of Am.
Medical Colleges v. Califano, 569 F.2d 101, 112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although mandamus
was never a part of § 41, the court found § 205(h) a bar where administrative procedures
existed. Nonetheless, the court suggested that mandamus might be appropriate to compel the
Secretary to act administratively.
280 Ste Hospital San Jorge, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 598 F.2d 684, 686 (1st Cir. 1979);
Rhode Island Hosp. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 1153 (1st Cir. 1979); Humana of South Carolina,
Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs
of Private Hosp., Inc., v. Califano, 575 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1978); Dr. John T. MacDonald
Foundation, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893
(1978); Trinity Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.
1977); Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Califano, 569 F.2d 101, 105-13 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1975);
Unihealth Servs. Corp. v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 811, 813-17 (E.D. La. 1979); Kechijian v.
Califano, 458 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (D.R.I. 1978), afd, 621 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1980); John Muir
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 848, 852-56 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (§ 205h bars if
claim "arises under" Medicare Act); Lodi Memorial Hosp. v. Califano, 451 F. Supp. 651, 655
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question, then, is how much of a bar Congress intended, or the courts
will allow, section 205(h) to be. In particular, when and to what
extent can courts review constitutional, procedural and substantive
issues raised in the Medicare context?
As a starting point, it is worthwhile to consider the minimally
acceptable interpretation of section 205(h) and Sa4ft in the Medicare
context. While Safi held that section 205(h) is not merely a codifica-
tion of the exhaustion of administrative review doctrine, litigants are
at least required to exhaust the administrative and judicial review
procedures provided in the Medicare Act.28 Review is prohibited if
a constitutional cause of action exists merely because of a failure to
pursue administrative remedies.2 82 The courts have not been recep-
tive to the argument that administrative review of constitutional
claims is futile.283 The courts have also noted that the agency can
avoid the constitutional question by deciding the case on another
ground.284 Further, where the problem involves an agency interpre-
tation of a statute or regulation, the Secretary may be able to correct
the situation. Where no secretarial review exists for administrative
(D.D.C. 1978); Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 450 F. Supp.
1158, 1161 (D. Ore. 1978); Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 445 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.
Ind. 1977) (later transferred to the Court of Claims); Cleveland Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Califano, 444 F. Supp. 125, 127 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (dicta; jurisdiction existed under § 1395oo),
affd, 594 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1979); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.
Ky. 1977); Cervoni v. HEW, 440 F. Supp. 750, 751 (D.P.R. 1977), aj'd, 581 F.2d 1010 (1st
Cir. 1978); Pacific Coast Medical Enterprises v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 296, 302 (C.D. Cal.
1977), modified, 633 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980); Daytona Beach Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger,
435 F. Supp. 891 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Medical Center v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 837, 841 (W.D.
Mo. 1977); Hillside Community Hosp. v. Mathews, 423 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(but court found APA jurisdiction prior to Sanders v. Califano); Aristocrat South, Inc. v.
Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D.D.C. 1976); Simoncelli v. Weinberger, 418 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.
Pa. 1976). See also St. Louis Univ. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Servs., 537 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (while § 205h bars, would allow for constitutional question).
281 Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Rhode
Island Hosp. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 1153 (1st Cir. 1978) (provider challenge brought under
§ 1331 improper for failure to pursue available § 1395ff(o) remedies); Association of Am.
Medical Colleges v. Califano, 569 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (failure to challenge via PRRB,
even where challenge was futile, barred under § 205(h) and Sao); Milo Community Hosp. v.
Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1975); John Muir Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Califano, 457 F. Supp. 848, 855 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Muir has a constitutional cause of action
only because it failed to pursue its administrative remedies); Medical Center v. Califano, 433
F. Supp. 837, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (1970-72 claims appeal still pending before Blue Cross
Ass'n); Aristocrat South, Inc. v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1976) (PRRB could de-
cide if regulation was arbitrary and capricious so review was not fruitless).
282 John Muir Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 848, 855 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
283 Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Aristocrat South, Inc. v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1976).
284 420 F. Supp. at 23.
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decisions, however, direct review by the courts should be provided.285
The most extreme judicial interpretation of Sa/fi and section
205(h) is that there is no review of any Medicare issues except as
explicitly provided for in the Medicare Act. Courts accepting such
an interpretation have focused on the Supreme Court's statement
that section 205(h) "is sweeping and direct" and "states that no ac-
tion shall be brought under [section] 1331.1"286 This interpretation
ignores the context of the statement and remainder of the opinion.
First, the Supreme Court made the statement while refuting the con-
tention that section 205(h) merely codified the exhaustion doc-
trine.287 Second, finding section 205(h) a complete bar to review is
contrary to Johnson288 and to the Supreme Court's attempt to distin-
guish it in Sa6fi. 289 Just as with the disability program considered in
Johnson, the Medicare Act does not always provide for judicial review
and where constitutional questions are presented review is presumed
or may exist regardless of Congress's actions. Johnson is the appropri-
ate precedent where no judicial review exists for particular Medicare
questions but review is not explicitly barred.
The absurdity of finding section 205(h) an absolute bar to Medi-
care review is exemplified in Paqft Coast Medical Enterprises v.
Califano.290 A provider challenged the Secretary's denial of reim-
bursement for 1970 to 1973 costs involving the purchase of a hospi-
tal's stock. The court found the Secretary's actions unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious and in clear error.291 Nevertheless, the court
found it had no jurisdiction to remedy these violations for 1970 to
1972 due to section 205(h). As to the 1973 period, the court re-
manded to the PRRB. Even assuming the provider could get relief
in the Court of Claims, the decision is contrary to Congress's goal of
economical resolution of disputes.
Most courts have found section 205(h) to constitute only a par-
285 An example of such a situation is presented by a case where no review was available
because the PRRB had not yet been established. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States,
616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl. 1980). As Congress noted in forming the PRRB, the problem was that
there were no specific procedures to obtain administrative or judicial review. See S. REP. No.
1230, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 51 (1972).
286 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 757 (1975). See, e.g., Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. Blue
Cross Ass'n, 445 F. Supp. 617, 618-19 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (later transferred to the Court of
Claims). The court stated: "The holding in Safl6 provides an absolute bar to judicial review
unless specifically provided for within the Social Security Act." Id at 618.
287 422 U.S. at 757.
288 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974).
289 422 U.S. at 761-62.
290 440 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1977), modfied, 633 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980).
291 440 F. Supp. at 307.
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tial bar to federal question jurisdiction after Safi.292 The majority of
these courts have avoided the Saft-johnson question of whether Con-
gress could preclude review either by noting the existence of review
in the Court of Claims 293 or determining that no constitutional claim
was presented. 294 These courts have relied on the Supreme Court's
statement that a statute precluding review of constitutional questions
would itself pose serious constitutional questions. 295 Moreover, the
availability of judicial review of constitutional claims is presumed,
absent clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended other-
wise.296 The Fifth Circuit stated that it could "happily" avoid both
questions because they were raised only if no avenues of relief were
available.297 Since the Court of Claims has held that it has jurisdic-
292 See text accompanying note 280 supra.
293 Hospital San Jorge v. Secretary of HEW, 598 F.2d 684, 686 (Ist Cir. 1979) (the court
noted a possible exception if review of constitutional questions is precluded; however, plaintiff
failed to present a colorable claim to challenge the administrative procedures); American
Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs v. Califano, 575 F.2d 1367, 1373 (5th Cir. 1978) (§ 205(h)
bars suits and this bar does not violate due process); Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v.
Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (all avenues of relief are not foreclosed
since the Court of Claims has declared its jurisdiction); Trinity Memorial Hosp. v. Associated
Hosp. Serv., 570 F.2d 660, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1977) (no question of Court of Claims jurisdiction
since § 41 of title 28 did not include § 1491); South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v.
Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1976) (jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Court of
Claims) (but see MacDonald questioning ability to so "hold"). See also Humana of South
Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1076 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1978); St. Louis Univ. Hosp. v.
Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.) (review available for constitutional questions,
however, none were presented), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Hazelwood Chronic & Con-
valescent Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (D. Ore. 1978) (stating Court of
Claims jurisdiction); Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 445 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ind.
1977) (finding § 205(h) an absolute bar but transferring the case to the Court of Claims). Cf.
Daytona Beach Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 435 F. Supp. 891 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (Sao
barred § 1331 jurisdiction, including Court of Claims jurisdiction, but court could review due
process violation); Rhode Island Hosp. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 1153, 1159 (1st Cir. 1978) (con-
trasts St. Louis Hosp. where no review available); Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010,
1015-17 (1st Cir. 1978) (no constitutional problem because no constitutional question
presented).
294 See Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010, 1015-17 (1st Cir. 1978) (no constitu-
tional problem because no constitutional question presented). But see Chelsea Community
Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the
assumption of review to decide constitutional questions).
295 Weinberger v. Safi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975); Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v.
Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Association of Am. Medical Colleges v.
Califano, 569 F.2d 101, 107 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
296 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67
(1974).
297 Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc).
[October 1981]
REVIEW OF MEDICARE ISSUES
tion to review questions of law,2 98 the courts have, "happily," been
able to avoid the hard questions. The Second and Seventh Circuits
have even gone so far as to hold that the Court of Claims has jurisdic-
tion over Medicare claims.
299
While it is tempting to ignore the problem presented by section
205(h), resort to the Court of Claims is not entirely satisfactory. Liti-
gants are usually able to fashion their claims for relief in terms of
monetary claims, but such claims may waste both litigant and court
time. Because the Court of Claims is unable to provide equitable or
declaratory relief,30° challenges to the promulgation of regulations
30 1
or to procedural defects must all wind their way through administra-
tive procedures and the Court of Claims. Such challenges often
could be decided much earlier by mandamus or declaratory judg-
ment. Furthermore, not all courts recognize jurisdiction in the Court
of Claims, and some have refused to transfer cases.
30 2
Avoiding the jurisdictional question by determining that no via-
ble substantive problem is presented for review seems a poor analyti-
cal choice. In Hospital San Jorge, Inc. v. Secretarg of Health, Education &
Welfare,303 the First Circuit indicated that it had no jurisdiction over
a provider's reimbursement suit unless a viable constitutional claim
was presented. The court assumed, without deciding, that the hospi-
tal had a protected property right but found no constitutional viola-
tion.3 4 As the Sixth Circuit has noted, this practice of hypothesizing
jurisdiction cannot provide a meaningful review of constitutional
questions.3
0 5
298 Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
969 (1977).
299 Trinity Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 570 F.2d 660, 667 (7th
Cir. 1977); South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.
1976). See also Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 450 F. Supp.
1158, 1161 (D. Ore. 1978). But see Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n,
630 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1980) (questioning the Fifth Circuit's power to "hold" that the
Court of Claims has jurisdiction).
300 See note 272 sufira.
301 See, e.g., Faith Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 634 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
302 See Pacific Coast Medical Enterprises v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
modifud, 633 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980).
303 598 F.2d 684 (lst Cir. 1979).
304 Id at 687. See also Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010, 1017-19 (1st Cir.
1978).
305 Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th
Cir. 1980). The court stated: "[W]e must note that the practice of assuming jurisdiction
arguendo cannot provide a meaningful review of constitutional claims." Id Accord, Rogers, A
Way Out ofthe Social SecuriYJuridictional Tangle, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 689, 714 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Rogers].
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The best reasoned decisions appear to be Sixth Circuit and
Eighth Circuit decisions holding that the courts have the power to
review all constitutional challenges. In St. Louis Universiy v. Blue Cross
Hospital Service ,306 the Eighth Circuit held that review of a reimburse-
ment amount was barred by section 205(h)30 7 but that consideration
of due process violations was not.30 8 The provider challenged the
constitutionality of the Provider Appeals Committee, the private or-
ganization responsible for determining the proper amount of reim-
bursement. While eventually finding the committee structure
permissible, the court thoroughly analyzed its jurisdiction to make
that determination. Judge Bright, writing for the court, indicated
that serious problems would be raised by the preclusion of judicial
review.3 09 He then noted three distinctions from the Social Security
situation in Salfi. First, while the litigants in Saft sought recovery of
a claim, the provider's primary goal in St. Louir Unersity was to ob-
tain an adequate hearing which had no direct bearing on the amount
of reimbursement owed. Second, unlike the situation in Salf, the
Medicare Act does not otherwise provide a means of review and the
"plain words" of section 205(h) do not preclude constitutional chal-
lenges. Finally, section 205(h) is only incorporated into Medicare "as
applicable." Since such a statute is meant to give force and effect to
the incorporating statute, it should be read to avoid constitutional
uncertainty.3 10
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in Chelsea Community
Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross Associalion.311 The court focused on
discerning legislative intent and employed the presumptions favoring
judicial review. The court considered the availability of judicial re-
view for all Social Security issues a crucial factor in the Salft decision.
Thus, it adopted the Court of Claims interpretation that review was
not entirely precluded by section 205(h) because "it is a 'cardinal
principle' that we should seek statutory constructions which avoid
306 537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1976).
307 Id at 287-89. The court noted that amount determinations were the type of technical
questions which Congress intended to preclude from review. Thus, to the extent the provider
sought payments under the Medicare Act, jurisdiction was barred by § 1331. Id at 289. Of
course, for years after 1973, Congress specifically provided review through the Provider Reim-
bursement Review Board. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1976).
308 537 F.2d at 292.
309 Id at 291-92.
310 Id at 292.
311 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980). See also Arkansas Soc'y of Pathologists v. Harris, 4
MED. & MED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,706 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (similar decision).
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constitutional doubts. 3 12 Several lower courts have also determined
that federal question jurisdiction was available as a basis for constitu-
tional review where no alternative means existed.313 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, is the first court to realize the practical effects of any
other decision. Participation in Medicare is voluntary and, as the
Sixth Circuit noted, "making provider reimbursements unreviewable
would doubtless chill the provision of care to beneficiaries, or perhaps
worse, would encourage providers to cheapen the care given to Medi-
care patients.
3 14
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits fall somewhat short of the Court
of Claims interpretation of section 205(h) because purely substantive
claims were not considered. While either the Secretary's failure to
conform to a regulation, or the application of an invalid regulation,
are arguably reviewable under procedural due process, the review of
legal issues should be explicit and direct. As the Eighth Circuit
noted, Congress was intent on barring the courts from considering
the "complex interplay" between facts and technology in determin-
ing the appropriate amount of reimbursement. 315 Congress is also
concerned that private enterprise participate in the Medicare pro-
gram.316 Program participation is discouraged if the Secretary is not
required to abide by the governing law or if there is no means of
challenging the Secretary's interpretations.
312 630 F.2d at 1135.
313 Northeast Emergency Medical Assocs. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Pacemaker Monitor Corp. v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 473, 477 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
Daytona Beach Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 435 F. Supp. 891, 899 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (no
general jurisdiction but ability to review due process violation); Russi v. Matthews, 438 F.
Supp. 1036, 1041 (E.D. Va. 1977) jurisdiction under § 1331 to review due process and equal
protection claims); Columbia Heights Nursing Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 380 F.
Supp. 1066 (M.D. La. 1974); Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 263 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
314 630 F.2d at 1136. The court stated:
We cannot believe that Congress intended in 1965 that Medicare providers
would be "entitled" to whatever reimbursement the Secretary (or fiscal intermedi-
ary) granted, be it high or low, fairly or unfairly set. The Medicare Act does not, of
course, show any legislative intent to aid providers of care for their own sakes. E.g.,
Green v. Cashman, 605 F.2d 945, 946 (6th Cir. 1979). The Congressional concern
was rather for the Act's beneficiaries. Id Yet making provider reimbursements
unreviewable would doubtless chill the provision of care to beneficiaries, or perhaps
worse, would encourage providers to cheapen the care given to Medicare patients.
More scrupulous providers might choose to offset insufficient Medicare reimburse-
ments by charging higher fees to non-Medicare patients. This would contravene
one objective of the Act, which is that "the costs of services of [sic] individuals
covered by the program will not be borne by individuals not covered. . ..
315 537 F.2d at 289.
316 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b (1976).
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The D.C. Circuit added another dimension to Medicare juris-
diction when it concluded that section 205(h) was not a bar to a pro-
vider's challenge that the Secretary had failed to follow the APA
rulemaking methodology. 31 7 The provider alleged that the Secretary
failed to give notice and allow comment. Since review was otherwise
unavailable, the court held federal question jurisdiction allowed
consideration.
One commentator has suggested a path out of the present mo-
rass based upon the type of situation presented.318 Analyzing pro-
vider reimbursement claims, the author concludes that while section
205(h) bars claims brought purely for reimbursement, 319 procedural
claims collateral to reimbursement claims are reviewable, as the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Eighth Circuits have concluded. 320 Courts
other than the Court of Claims should review "substantive constitu-
tional claims. '321 Unfortunately, this analysis does not make appro-
317 Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
318 Note, Federal QwstionJursdiction over Medicare Arovider Appeals after Weinberger v. Salfi:
Towarda Pincipled Construction of the Statutoy Bar, 65 VA. L. REv. 1383, 1384 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Federal Qyslion Jurisdiction].
319 Id at 1389-90. The Note concludes that all claims challenging the amount of reim-
bursement are barred by § 205(h). This conclusion is more appropriately reached by recog-
nizing that questions of fact are not reviewable by the courts due to § 205(h). Additionally,
for many amount determination claims, administrative review is provided. If the plaintiff
fails to exhaust administrative remedies, judicial review is precluded.
320 Id at 1391-95. The author determines that Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v.
Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., 537
F.2d 283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976), correctly concluded that procedural con-
stitutional claims were reviewable. That conclusion is inappropriate if administrative review
is available. In other words, administrative review must be exhausted. The Note also im-
properly criticizes the Seventh Circuit's decision to transfer cases to the Court of Claims.
Trinity Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977).
The author comments that since the Court of Claims has jurisdiction only over claims against
the United States it cannot decide disputes between claimants and the fiscal intermediaries or
carriers. Federal QuestionJuisdiction, supra note 318, at 1392 n.58. That is incorrect. The pri-
vate organizations involved in the Medicare Act constitute agents of the United States gov-
ernment and their actions confer jurisdiction against the United States. Sacred Heart Hosp.
v. United States, 630 F.2d 1131 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Further, the Court of Claims is not necessarily
a less familiar or more geographically distant forum than other federal courts of appeals.
Federal QuestionJurisdiction,supra note 318, at 1393 n.63. First, for initial decisions the relevant
comparison is between district courts and the Court of Claims trial division which sits where
the dispute is centered. Second, the Court of Claims is becoming the "familiar" forum for
litigating Medicare disputes due to its own decisions and the decisions of the circuit courts.
Moreover, the Court of Claims is able to render decisions with national coverage obviating
the inter-circuit conflicts now found in Medicare law. Thus, the question remains whether
other federal courts must transfer procedural claims, which of necessity involve a claim for
reimbursement, to the Court of Claims.
321 Federal QuestionJursdiction,supra note 318, at 1395-1400. The term "substantive consti-
tutional claims" is of minimal analytic utility. The only purely constitutional claims a Medi-
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priate allowance for the Court of Claims' function.3 22 Moreover, it
focuses only on provider claims whereas individual and Part B claims
are equally important.3 23 The appropriate decision is made by ana-
lyzing three factors: (1) the availability of review encompassed in
the Medicare Act; (2) whether questions of fact or law are presented,
and (3) whether the issues are "raised under" the Medicare Act or
other federal provisions.
Analyzing these factors, it is clear that review is absolutely pre-
cluded under federal question jurisdiction whenever, the Medicare
Act expressly provides for review in a particular manner and the liti-
gant fails to follow the required procedures. If no review of constitu-
tional questions can be obtained, however, federal question
jurisdiction and Tucker Act jurisdiction are available. It must also
be recognized that review of purely substantive issues is necessary.
Congress has made it clear that it considers factual questions in
Medicare generally inappropriate for review by the federal courts.
3 24
Thus, even a private organization's determinations of fact are not
reviewable.3 25 The redetermination of basic factual issues is even
barred where legal questions are involved, although not necessarily
the application of law to established facts.3 26 Consequently, in cases
requiring a reapplication of law and finding of new facts, a remand
to the Secretary is proper.
3 27
care claimant could raise are: (1) a fifth amendment taking due to the failure to reimburse,
see, e.g., Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978); (2) sub-
stantive (i.e., equal protection) or procedural due process claims; and (3) whether § 205(h)
can constitutionally bar review. Unfortunately, Sa6 has broad dicta indicating that all
claims stemming from involvement in the Medicare program arise under the statute and not
under the Cohstitution. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975); John Muir Memo-
rial Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 848,853 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Thus, the initial question
remains whether a constitutional question involving a Medicare issue can be reviewed and, if
so, in which forum.
322 See note 316 supa.
323 While most claims involve providers, those are now covered by the PRRB. A provider
can now obtain review where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. A more general
analysis is required for lesser claims, Part B issues or questions involving other statutes. E.g.,
American Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs of Private Hosps. v. Califano, 575 F.2d 1367
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (violation of APA).
324 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976); St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283,
289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
325 See Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1978). Contrast, however,
due process challenges to the private organization's or the agency's fact finding. The ques-
tion, however, is not the ability of those two agencies to sift and weigh the facts but the
manner in which it is done.
326 See, e.g., Faith Hosp. v. United States, 634 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (court reapplied law
to the given facts).
327 The Court of Claims is particularly lax in this regard, having failed to remand any
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Further, cases involving Medicare but "arising under" another
act are cognizable. For instance, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that a suit challenging the Secretary's adherence to the APA
was reviewable under federal question jurisdiction.3 28 Similarly, a
suit involving a Freedom of Information Act request would not seem
barred by section 205(h).
Finally, when Medicare participants have legitimate constitu-
tional claims which are not directly reviewable under existing admin-
istrative procedures, judicial review must be available. Section
205(h) should not be considered a bar to the presentation of constitu-
tional issues. As the Supreme Court indicated in bothJohnson and
Sa4l, constitutional review should not be precluded in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to do so.
3 29
The courts should interpret section 205(h) in a manner which is both
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and avoids possible consti-
tutional violations. One commentator has argued for the same result
by suggesting that purely constitutional questions should not be con-
sidered to "arise under" Medicare thereby escaping the bar of section
205(h).330
Uncertainty concerning Medicare jurisdiction presently exists
from circuit to circuit. To further confuse potential litigants, the dis-
trict courts hear some cases and the Court of Claims others. Two
institutions are at fault. The Supreme Court should establish in
which instances federal question jurisdiction is available and resolve
inter-circuit conflicts. More importantly, Congress should thor-
oughly examine the jurisdictional situation and decide specifically
what courts should review which issues. It may be constitutionally
acceptable to bar reconsideration of factual decisions,331 but review
of substantive and constitutional claims should be provided, particu-
cases for redetermination. Apparently, that decision is made to eliminate the "needless" task
of having an administrative decision made where a judicial judgment is easily rendered. The
more appropriate, and innovative, procedure is for the court to affirm the original fact finding
of a lower administrative tribunal and to declare the subsequent agency reversal contrary to
the law, see Sacred Heart Hosp. v. United States, 616 F.2d 477 (Ct. Cl. 1980),folowedin Sun
City Community Hosp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 997 (Ct. Cl. 1980), or to remand the case to
the agency, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). See also Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1980)
(no jurisdictional bar in § 405(g) & (h) to determining whether claimant's mental illness ne-
gated res judicata effect of prior decisions).
328 Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
329 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 373; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 762.
330 Rogers, supra note 305, at 722-26.
331 Again the distinction must be made between the actual finding of fact-which may be
unreviewable---as opposed to the procedure used to find the facts-which undoubtedly is
reviewable.
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larly if Congress wants to encourage the continued involvement of
private organizations in the administration of the Medicare system.
IV. Conclusion
Elderly patients, their physicians and other members of the
health care system with potential Medicare grievances face a confus-
ing administrative and judicial mechanism for resolution of their dis-
putes. Administratively, there are five different systems of review
complying with the Constitution in varying degrees but generally ac-
cording greater rights to institutions than to the individual for whom
the Medicare system was designed. Assuming the potential litigant
negotiates the administrative maze, a new challenge awaits in at-
tempting to secure judicial review. Under the present system, the
Court of Claims is available to review claims derived from illegal
administrative actions by the agency. Additionally, the district
courts can review most issues using federal question jurisdiction de-
spite the bar imposed by section 205(h).
All told, the Medicare system is in need of change. Greater ad-
ministrative review must be provided for individuals. Given the ad-
ministrative delegation to private insurers, the courts should provide
full review for fundamental legal questions. The added burden to
the judiciary would be minimal and greater protection of individual
rights would be afforded.
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